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The three works under review in this Essay cover a wide 
variety of approaches to thinking about and describing the task 
of judging, in its ideal and not-so-ideal states. Even so, they 
reflect only a sliver of a vibrant and burgeoning academic 
literature analyzing and assessing the nature of the judicial 
1. Professor of Law. Duke University. 
2. Circuit Judge. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: and 
Senior Lecturer. University of Chicago Law SchooL 
3. Sho Sato Professor of Law. University of California. Berkeley. 
4. Herman 0. Loewenstein Professor of Law. Vanderbilt Universitv. 
5. Associate Professor. University of Alabama School of Law. I a~ grateful to the 
John Marshall Law School in Atlanta and the Prawfsfest conference hosted by Florida 
State University College of Law for comments received on a presentation of an early 
draft of this paper. and to Bill Araiza. Marc DeGirolami. Michael Dimino. Dave 
Fagundes. Brian Galle. Andy Hessick. Carissa Hessick. Rob Kar. Erik Knutsen. Zak 
Kramer. Dan Markel. Chad Oldfather. and Lesley Wexler for comments. Thank you to 
Jennifer Michaelis and Martha Rogers for valuable research assistance and Kelly 
Horwitz for support. The title of this Review Essay is inspired by Richard A. Posner. 
Judges· Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?). 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421 (1995). 
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function." The questions they ask, and even some of the answers 
they provide, are hardly new; in many respects, we all stand in 
the shadow of Benjamin Cardozo's grand work on this topic, 
now approaching its ninetieth anniversary.' Thanks to 
interdisciplinary work drawn from political science, psychology, 
behavioral economics, and other fields, however, the work on 
this subject has approached a new level of sophistication and a 
fever pitch of interest. Today, more than at any period since the 
first flush of legal realism, judges stand at the bar of judgment, 
by their peers and themselves.R 
Each of the books discussed here approaches the subject of 
judging, and the question of what constitutes the proper nature 
and role of judges, in a different spirit, whatever common 
features they may happen to possess. H. Jefferson Powell's book, 
Constitutional Conscience: The Moral Dimension of Judicial 
Decision, offers what its title suggests: a moral account of 
judging, focusing particularly on constitutional interpretation, 
that describes the ideal judge in terms of the virtues that should 
be embodied in his or her work. 
In How Judges Think, Judge Richard Posner, who figures as 
a foil in Powell's book (Powell3-6, 9-10, 91, 107), provides a far 
less idealistic account of judging, one that is based substantially 
on empirical studies of the judicial task and that describes judges 
rather less romantically as being driven by the incentives of a 
highly specialized job market. Although Posner too has a judicial 
method to offer-pragmatism-it is not nearly as romantic a 
vision of judging as Powell's, and the book on the whole is a 
typical Posnerian soak in the acid bath. 
6. For one among many examples. see Symposium. Measuring Judges and Justice. 
58 DUKE L.J. 1173-1823 (2009). For a superb syllabus for a course on judging and the 
judicial process that collects many relevant sources. see Chad M. Oldfather. Course 
Materials for a Seminar on Judging and the Judicial Process. Marquette University Law 
Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series. Research Paper No. 08-28 (Nov. 2008). 
available at http://ssm.cornlabstract=1297423. 
7. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO. THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
Charles Clark and David Trubek noted the fortieth anniversary of Cardozo's book by 
observing that a then-contemporary "strange recrudescence in legal literature of the 
thesis that judges must find or restate. and not make. law suggests that every generation 
must rediscover these truths for itself." Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubek. The 
Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition. 71 
YALE L.J. 255 (1961). 
8. Cf ANTHONY T. KRONMAN. THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION 5 (1995) ("In the past it was enough simply to praise a lawyer for 
possessing good judgment. without inquiring too deeply into the nature of this complex 
power. That is no longer true."). 
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Finally, Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, in Judgment 
Calls: Principle and Politics in Constitutional Law, attempt to 
split the difference between Posner and Powell. Like Posner, 
they offer an account of judging, again focused on the Supreme 
Court's role as constitutional interpreter, that draws, albeit 
lightly, on empirical work on the judicial role and promotes a 
pragmatic approach to judging. Like Powell, however, there is a 
distinct air of idealism to their conclusions, and they too draw on 
a list of virtues that they argue should characterize the work of 
the courts. 
What all these disparate visions of the judicial role arguably 
have in common is a focus on what I will call the role of judicial 
character. How to define judicial character at all, let alone how 
to define and spot good judicial character, is, of course, itself a 
difficult question. ''Character" in a broad sense can mean 
nothing more than the "assemblage of qualities that distinguish 
one individual from another. .. ~ Whether there is such a thing as a 
distinctly "judicial'' character even in this narrow sense can be 
controversial. Posner, for example, suggests that "no general 
analytic procedure distinguishes legal reasoning from other 
practical reasoning," that judges by and large engage in 
''ordinary, everyday reasoning" rather than something 
distinctive (Posner 248). StilL even denying the distinctiveness of 
judicial character can serve to put the question of character at 
issue. In a sense, then, all theories about the nature of the 
judicial role must begin by asking whether there is anything 
special about judges and judging. 
One way to begin to answer these questions is to draw on a 
stronger conception of judicial character-a virtue-centered, or 
"aretaic," approach to character. The aretaic approach does not 
simply ask what (if anything) makes judges distinct but is 
concerned instead with what makes good judges distinct. In this 
sense, "[w]hen we speak of a moral virtue or an excellence of 
character, the emphasis is not on mere distinctiveness or 
personality, but on the combination of qualities that make an 
individual the sort of ethically admirable person he is. " 10 In 
various ways, that is the concern of each of these books: 
identifying the character traits that distinguish the admirable, 
excellent, or virtuous judge. 
9. Marcia Homiak. Moral Character. in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
(2007). available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-character. 
10. !d. 
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Happily, we have tools at hand that might help us to 
consider this question in a more thoughtful and detailed way. 
The revival of virtue ethics in philosophy has begun to make its 
way into legal theory, and with it, we have seen a slowly 
increasing interest in "a virtue-centered theory of judging-an 
account of adjudication based on a theory of judicial 
excellence." 11 
This approach is not without its dangers or limitations. 
Substantively, the kinds of virtues that such an inquiry usually 
comes up with in considering the judicial role risk being so 
abstract or bland as to deprive them of any meaningful guidance 
and do not contribute anything we would not already have heard 
in what Posner aptly calls "the loftiest Law Day rhetoric" 
(Posner 1 ). Or the aretaic account may be treated as leading to a 
thick view of what judicial character demands; the thicker the 
account, however, the more likely it is to be controversial. 
Descriptively, one has reason to worry about the value of an 
aretaic approach if the judicial virtues, so identified, are simply 
too unrealistic. A theory of judging, or of judicial excellence, 
may be so unrooted from the actual practices and incentives of 
judges that it becomes nearly mythic-a sort of Easter Bunny for 
lawyers. 
Of course. a virtue-centered account of judicial character 
might be an ideal or benchmark rather than being assumed to 
describe any particular judge. 1 ~ But if this account is too 
normative and not descriptive enough, and if it fails to capture 
the actual moves made by judges and the reasons for their 
moves, the gulf between "is" and "ought" will threaten to 
capsize the project. 13 Descriptions of even virtuous judging must 
not fail to take into account what Frederick Schauer calls "the 
inglorious determinants of judicial behavior." 14 
11. Lawrence B. Solum. The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory. 70 BROOK. L. 
REV. 475. 478 (2005): see generally VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence 
Solum eds .. 2007). 
12. See, e.g .. Kronman. supra note 8. at 5. 
13. In a recent paper. Richard Fall on observes that "the general topic of existence. 
nature. and efficacy of constitutional constraints has received little systematic exploration 
by legal scholars:· owing largely to the normative focus of most constitutional theory. 
Richard H. Fallon. Jr.. Constitutional Constraints. 97 Stan. L. Rev. 975. 977 (2009): see 
also Clark & Trubek. supra note 7. at 268 (arguing. against those who would "develop[] a 
new mythology of the judicial process to replace the myth destroyed by the realists.'' that 
any such vision "is a vision purchased at the price of omitting a crucial aspect of the 
judicial process as it really is. The omission. we submit. is dangerous"). 
14. Frederick Schauer. Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of 
Judicial Behavior. 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615 (2000). 
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In this Review Essay, I use the books under review, 
supplemented by a dose of aretaic jurisprudence, to attempt to 
thread the needle between the "is" and the "ought"- between 
the worldly, post-realist, post-interdisciplinary view of the judge 
that features in books like Posner's and, to a much lesser extent, 
Farber and Sherry's, and the more idealistic vision of judicial 
character represented in Powell's paean to "constitutional 
conscience" (and, again to a lesser extent, in Farber and Sherry's 
work). 
I should acknowledge up front that this goal will remain at 
least partly unfulfilled. There simply is a gap between what we 
might want to believe about judging and the actual task of 
judging. let alone the performance of that task. One may thus 
leave this Essay with a sense of being caught between the 
judicial world that one wishes existed and the one that actually 
does exist. 1' StilL I will argue in this Essay that it is possible to 
bridge the gap-a little. We can do so largely by taking the 
accounts of the real world of judging as a given reality, and 
working within the internal and external constraints on judges' 
roles and motivations to find gaps and crevices in which a more 
idealistic conception of judicial character might take root and 
even thrive. 
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I provides an 
introduction to the renewed empirical and theoretical interest in 
judicial role and character, and summarizes some of the 
dominant approaches to these subjects. Part II offers a 
descriptive reading of what each of the authors of the books 
under review contributes to these questions. Part III builds on 
this descriptive account by offering a more critical assessment of 
these books. 
In Part IV, I ask whether it is possible to split the difference 
among these books in a more detailed and thoughtful way, by 
asking what virtue ethics might add to our understanding of 
judicial character. In doing so, I also necessarily ask whether 
judicial character actually matters. It will come as no surprise by 
now to say that I conclude that it does. But how it matters is a 
complicated question with many implications for a sound 
understanding of the judicial role and judicial character. 
15. Or. as I put it in a shorter review of the Posner and Powell books. "mv heart ... 
lies substantially (although not entirely) with Powell." but "[m]y head is with Posner." 
Paul Horwitz. 9 E'iGAGE: THE JOL"R'iAL OF THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY'S PRACTICE 
GROCPS 143. 145. 146 (June 2008). http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/pubid. 
1069/pub_detail.asp. 
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Ultimately, the vision I offer involves a mix of the 
descriptive and the normative. To say that judicial character 
matters, and that it makes sense to think in terms of judicial 
character and judicial virtue, is as much or more an "ought" than 
an "is." I argue, however, that there may be ways to bridge the 
distance a little between the two. One important vehicle for 
doing so is a renewed focus on the judicial oath as a means of 
understanding the role that judicial character might play in a 
sound understanding of the judicial role. That approach might 
itself seem romantic or quixotic: do judges really spend much 
time pondering their oaths? I argue, however, that the oath 
might be a means of using the internal and external constraints 
on judging considered by Posner to bring us somewhat closer to 
the conception of judicial virtue advanced by Powell. 
I. THEORIES OF JUDGING: A FIELD GUIDE 
As Frank Cross has recently observed, the prevailing 
approaches to understanding the judicial function often reduce 
to two antagonists: "the legalist theory of formalist decision-
making and the attitudinal theory of political decision-making.""' 
In its strongest form, the legalist model is often identified with 
formalist and, in the constitutional field, originalist judges like 
Antonio Scalia and Clarence Thomas. But legalism encompasses 
much besides this extreme version. Indeed, the legalist model is 
perhaps the most familiar understanding of judges for a wide 
range of lawyers, including strong formalists but extending to the 
Legal Process model of judging that continues to have a strong 
foothold in common professional understandings of the judicial 
role. 17 
16. Frank B. Cross. What Do Judges Want?. 87 TEX. L. REV. 183. 187 (2008). As 
Cross notes. the strategic theory of judging. which is sometimes identified as a third 
model of understanding the judicial process. can be viewed as "simply an approach to 
studying how the legalist and attitudinal theories are best implemented." /d. 
17. See, e.g .. William N. Eskridge. Jr .. & Philip P. Frickey. Foreword: Law as 
Equilibrium. 108 HARV. L. REV. 26. 27 (1994) (arguing that the legal process school 
commanded a majority of judges on the Supreme Court as it was constituted at the time). 
In Posner's terms. Justice Breyer. who is counted on this view as a member of the Legal 
Process school. would be identified as a pragmatist rather than a legalist (Posner 254). 
Even if we agree with this description. both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito 
arguably count as legalists. and thus maintain the primacy of both legalism in general and 
the Legal Process school in particular on the Supreme Court. See, e.g .. Akhil Reed Amar. 
Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning. 122 HARV. L. REV. 145. 181-82 (2008) 
(arguing that Roberts is influenced both by his education at Harvard Law School, the Ur-
Legal Process law school. and by his clerkship for Henry Friendly. a Legal Process-
oriented judge): Eric R. Claeys. Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the 
Rehnquist Court. 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 791. 819 (2005) (predicting that Chief 
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Posner describes legalism as the belief that "judicial 
decisions are determined by the 'law.' conceived as a body of 
preexisting rules found in canonical materials ... or derivable 
from those materials by logical operations" (Posner 41 ). The 
legalist's hope is that "a judicial decision [can] be determined by 
a body of rules constituting the ·law' rather than by factors that 
are personal to judges, in the sense of varying among them. such 
as ideology. personality, and personal background" (Posner 41). 
Thus, in the legalist universe, all judges are potentially the same. 
all have the same task, and all are working from the same 
materials in search of an elusive but non-mythical beast: the 
"right answer" to a legal question. 1' The belief in a single right 
answer is not essential to legalism; not every legalist believes 
that law lacks discretion. But the legalist does believe that there 
are at least "good," ''better," or "best" answers, and that these 
answers can be derived largely if not wholly from the legal 
materials at hand. 19 
Legalism is the prevailing mindset of the American lawyer. 
even in a post-realist age. That mindset is inculcated almost from 
the beginning of law school. It begins with the fundamental basis 
for legal education. the casebook. These tomes, departing a little 
from their Langdellian roots. often now contain the subtitle 
"cases and materials."~0 But no matter how many "materials" are 
shoehorned into a casebook. the primary text remains the 
judicial opinion, leavened in some courses with a diet of 
statutory materials.21 Although even the most traditionally 
oriented law school features traces of the influence of Yale Law 
School's Legal Realist challenge to the Langdellian tradition of 
legal education.2~ so that classroom discussions may be salted 
with occasional references to policy or interdisciplinary 
materials. for most law students these discussions are a side 
Justice Roberts will follow the Legal Process tradition). 
18. See, e.g .. RONALD DWORKIN. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOL"SLY 279-90 (1977) 
(claiming that even hard legal questions can yield one right answer). 
19. Although they describe themselves as pragmatists rather than legalists. Farber 
and Sherry's views of judging have a distinctly legalist cast. They argue that although 
legal reasoning is not .. a purely objective exercise:· judges can ··responsibly exercise their 
leeway in deciding hard cases .. in a way that .. makes it possible for the rule of law. rather 
than lawless fiat. to operate in a world that lacks the comforting certaintv of 
mathematical reasoning .. (Farber & Sherry ..j ). ' · 
20. See Clark Bvse. Fiftr Years of Legal Education. 71 IOWA L. REV. !Oh3. 10M 
(1988). 
21. See generally Russell L. Weaver. Langdel!"s Legacy: Li1·inR With the Case 
.'vlethod. 36 YILL. L. REV. 517 (1991 ). 
22. See LAL"RA KAL\!A:-;. LEGAL REA LIS\! A l YALE. !927-60 ( 198h). 
104 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 26:97 
show. The main event is still learning legal rules and methods 
from legal materials, primarily judicial opinions. Law students, 
like judges. remain largely "uninterested professionally in the 
social sciences. philosophy, or any other possible sources of 
guidance for making policy judgments," because they believe 
that task is secondary to the job of making "legal" judgments 
(Posner 42). 
From this acorn grows the judge, and judges especially are 
likely to pay at least lip service to the legalist model. Although 
Posner. after collecting a number of examples of judges speaking 
in openly pragmatic terms about their work, suggests that 
"[j]udges' writing on judging, as well as what they say in 
interviews. . . . is striking for the infrequency of legalist 
manifestos" (Posner 252), there is a problem of selection bias in 
this conclusion, because the most thoughtful and reflective 
judges are the most likely to write and talk about judging, and 
their departures from the conventional legalist model are likely 
to be all the more striking and memorable because they are 
exceptional. Most judges are apt not to say much about their job 
at all. and any law student or law professor who has sat through 
an array of speeches or classroom appearances by visiting judges 
is more likely to hear references to "reason" or "the rule of 
law"2' than to the latest social science research. The standard 
pronouncement of a judge, whether it is for public consumption 
only or accurately reflects the judge's self-perception, is still 
usually the kind of legalism that is reflected in "the loftiest Law 
Day rhetoric. "24 (Posner 1 ). Indeed, although they argue for the 
value of "transparency" in judging (Farber & Sherry 97-104). 
Farber and Sherry warn against "[a ]ttributing a judge's decisions 
to political motives" (Farber & Sherry 96) and argue that legal 
23. For classic written examples. see Antonin Scalia. The Rule of Law as a Law of 
Rules. 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989): J. Harvie Wilkinson III. The Role of Reason in the 
Rule of Law. 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 779 (1989). For a recent example by a sitting judge. see 
William H. Pryor Jr.. The Perspective of a Junior Circuit Judge on Judicial Modesty. 60 
FLA. L. REV. 1007. 1013 (2008) (asserting. against Posner's advocacy of judicial 
pragmatism. that "l consider myself to be a formalist or what Judge Posner calls a 
·legalist."') (citation omitted). 
2-l. But see David F. Levi. The Autocrat of the Armchair. 58 DUKE L.J. 1791. 1795-
96 (2009) (book review) ("[M]ost judges would vociferously deny that their decisions are 
ever influenced in the slightest by ·political' or personal considerations. and [that] most 
judges pretend that they are finding the law and not making it." that "most judges are 
more than aware that they are ·making law .... [M]ost judges. particularly the very best 
ones. are acutely aware of the potential of personal factors. including judicial philosophy. 
life experience. and personality. to affect how judges approach and then decide legal 
issues"). 
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academics should "proselytiz[ e r for "the rule of law as an ideal" 
(Farber & Sherry 130). 
In contrast to the legalist model is the attitudinal model of 
judging, which (with important variants) is the dominant model 
of political science thinking about the judicial function. 2' This 
model, drawing on studies of datasets involving judicial 
decisions, argues that judges can best be understood as "acting 
purely on the basis of their policy preferences. '' 2h 1 udges 
appointed by Republican presidents are thus more likely to 
favor "conservative" outcomes, all things being equal, and 
judges appointed by Democratic presidents are more likely to 
favor "liberal" outcomes. although both purport to be deciding 
the same case with the same legal materials (Posner 19-23 ). 
Frank Cross observes that "[t]he evidence of an ideological, 
attitudinal role in judicial decision making is now enormous. "2, 
Posner argues that "[t]he attidudinalists' traditional 
preoccupation with politically charged cases decided by the 
Supreme Court creates an exaggeration of the permeation of 
American judging by politics" (Posner 27). But he points out 
that "[a]ny amount of political judging challenges orthodox 
conceptions of the judicial process, . . . and the attitudinalists 
have shown that there is plenty at all levels of the American 
judiciary" (Posner 28). 
The strategic model of judging is a variant of the attitudinal 
model. It argues that attitudinalism does not capture the array of 
factors that will press on judges who wish to decide cases 
according to their policy preferences. including the need to 
account for the potential reaction of other judges, legislators. 
and the public. (Posner 29). Judges thus ''do not simply do the 
right thing as they see it." but instead "seek to have the right 
thing triumph in their court's decision and, more important, in 
public policy as a whole." which entails "think[ing] ahead to the 
prospective consequences [of their votes] and choos[ing] the 
25. Lawrence Baum argues that the .. strategic conception of judicial behavior is 
now the closest thing to a conventional wisdom about judicial behavior. .. LA WRE:--:CE 
BAUM. JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIEJ\CES: A PERSPECTIVE 0'-1 JL'DICIAL BEHAVIOR 7 
(2006). Although it is not clear. Baum·s statement appears to be directed primarily 
toward the field of political science. and I take his statement as most accurate if referring 
to political scientists rather than legal academics. The attidudinalist model is still the 
prevailing model in political science. if we count strategic models of judging as a more 
nuanced subset of attitudinalism. See Cross. supra note 16. at 187. 
26. Chad M. Oldfather. Judges as Humans: Interdisciplinary Research and the 
Problems of Institutional Design. 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125. 132 (2007). 
27. Cross. supra note 16. at 188. 
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course that does most to advance their goals in the long term. '' 2' 
A strategic judge might thus forgo a vote for a particular result 
that she favors on policy or ideological grounds. in order to 
achieve the greatest likelihood of having her preferences win out 
when all the necessarv factors and constituencies are 
considered.2" Strategic judges may even behave in a legalist 
fashion. although for very different reasons: they may believe 
that "the public expects them to act on a legal basis." and that "if 
they act in accord with public expectations. the public will be 
more willing to accept and comply with their decisions."'" In 
short. the strategic judge is an attitudinalist who games the 
system. 
Although the legalist. attitudinalist. and strategic models 
have been the dominant theories of the judicial function, that 
may now be changing. Critics of these approaches argue that. 
perhaps in order to provide the simplicity and predictability that 
one properly values in a model. these theories neglect the 
"messy and complex" character of human nature.' 1 That judges 
are human is no new insight, of course; Jerome Frank was 
putting judges on the psychoanalyst's couch almost 80 years 
ago.'2 The prevailing models, it is argued. pay insufficient 
attention to this fact, instead treating judges as acting "without 
emotion or self-interest in order to advance the general good."'' 
That assumption ignores a host of internal and external 
incentives and constraints on judges· motivations and actions. 
including. in addition to emotion and self-interest. bounded 
rationality. the desire to please particular audiences. the hope of 
promotion. the love of leisure, and the drive to reduce cognitive 
dissonance between what judges do and how they perceive 
themselves (Posner 31-39. 57-77).'~ 
For this reason, and because the interdisciplinary tools 
available for understanding these incentives and behaviors 
have grown much more sophisticated in recent years and 
gradually found their way into the legal academy, legal 
scholarship has witnessed a profusion of recent work focusing 
28. BAC~I. supra note 25. at 6. 
29. See id. 
30. /d. at 7. 
31. Oldfather. supra note 26. at 1-B. 
32. JERO~IE FRANK. LAW AND THE MODER:" MIND ( 1930): see also Jerome Frank. 
Are Judges Human.>. SOU. PA. L. REV.17 (1931). 
33. BAL'~I. supra note 25. at 18. 
34. See also Oldfather. supra note 26. at 133-34. 142-44. 
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on both the "judicial mind"" and the institutional and other 
external forces that may affect judges' decision-making process. 
The primary tools of this analysis have been economic.'" 
psychological,17 and. falling between the two,'' behavioral 
psychology or behavioral law and economics.'" This sort of 
analysis focuses on two aspects of judicial decision-making: the 
social and cognitive influences on judicial decisions, including 
the suite of cognitive limitations that have become familiar to 
readers of the literature on behavioral analysis of law. and the 
set of internal or external incentives or factors that influence 
judicial decisions. Scholars in this line consider what it is like 
for the judge. as a human being-whether a rational and self-
interested one, or a cognitively bounded one- to do his or her 
job.'10 By multiplying the factors involved in analyzing the 
judicial function, they sacrifice some of the simplicity and 
predictability offered by other models of the judicial process. 
but gain considerable descriptive force.~ 1 
One last model complete~ this brief tour of the prevailing 
models of the judicial process. That is the virtue-centered. or 
aretaic, model of judging, which I discuss at length in Part IV. 
This is the "account of adjudication based on a theory of 
35. See, e.g .. Chris Guthrie. et al.. Inside the Judicial Mind. H6 COR:-IELL L. REV. 777 
(2001 ): Jeffrey J. Rachlinski. et al.. Imide the Bankruptcv Judge's Mind. 86 B.U. L. REV. 
1227 (2006). 
36. See, e.g .. Richard A. Posner. What Do Judges and Justices Maximi~e? !The 
Same Thing Everyone Else Does). 3 S. CT. Eco~. RE\'. 1 ( 1993). 
37. See, e.g .. Dan Simon. A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making. 30 
Rl'TGERS L.J. I (1998): Lawrence S. Wrightsman. Judicial Decision Making: Is 
Psvchology Relevant? ( 1999). 
38. See Posner 35 (discussing the overlapping nature of the economic and 
psychological models of judging). What Posner. using some latitude. calls the 
"sociological" model of judging "straddles" these two approaches (Posner 34-35). 
39. See Oldfather. supra note 26. at 142-43: see also Stephen M. Bainbridge & Mitu 
Gulati. How Do Judges Maximi~e:' !The Same Way Everrhodr Else Does-Boundedly): 
Rules of Thumh in Securities Fraud Opinions. 51 Emory L.J. 83 (2002): Paul Horwitz. 
Free Speech as Risk Analvsis: Heuristics. Biases, and lnstitlllions in the First Amendment. 
76 TE~IP. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
40. Posner treats separately the "phenomenological theory of judicial behavior. .. 
which "studies first-person consciousness-experience as it presents itself to the 
conscious mind." so that we ask "what it feels like to make a judicial decision" (Posner 
40). Posner distinguishes this from the psychological model. which studies "primarily the 
unconscious processes of the human mind" (Posner 40). For present purposes. I group 
the phenomenological and psychological theories of judging together. since both depart 
from the more abstract and mechanical attitudinal model of judging and focus on the 
complexities of judges as individual decision makers. 
41. See Oldfather. supra note 26. at 144: see also id. at 144 n.104 ('"In theorv-
making. descriptive accuracy is purchased at a sacrifice of predictive power. ... ) ( quoti~g 
RICHARD A. POS'<ER. FRO~TIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 263 (20()] )). 
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judicial excellence. ''~2 It focuses on the desirability of judges 
possessing '"the judicial virtues-courage, temperance, judicial 
temperament. intelligence, and practical wisdom."~' As we will 
see, both Powell and Farber and Sherry draw heavily on this 
model. Its usual sources are philosophical in nature. relying in 
particular on Aristotelian models of virtue:w There is some 
room, however. for more empirically based virtue-oriented 
theories of judging. Lynn Stout, for instance, draws on the 
social science literature to argue that judges, for a variety of 
reasons, may act as altruists, who "care not just about costs 
and benefits to themselves but also about costs and benefits to 
others, including perhaps such abstract 'others' as the rule of 
law. or ideals of proper judicial conduct.,~, This is an 
important possibility. It suggests that virtue-centered models 
of judging need not be wholly aspirational, that they need not 
be simply idealized benchmarks for evaluating judicial 
character that bear no resemblance to the work done by 
judges on the ground. It means that, if we can find and 
encourage or exploit factors that might tend to push judges 
toward a virtuous model of judging. we might bridge the gap 
between "is" and ''ought" a little. 
II. THE JUDICIAL ''IS" AND "OUGHT": OF POSNER. 
POWELL, AND FARBER AND SHERRY 
This brief description of the dominant approaches to the 
judicial function and their recent competitors should serve as a 
suitable foundation for a consideration of the books under 
review. In this Part, I consider each of these books in turn. This 
section is intended to be simply a descriptive account of these 
books. I will take up a more critical assessment of the books in 
the next Part. 
A. POSNER 
How Judges Think begins bluntly and forthrightly with 
the statement that although legalism places some constraints 
on judges. '"its kingdom has shrunk and grayed to the point 
42. Solum. supra note 11. at 478. 
43. !d. 
44. Besides Solum and others who self-identify as virtue jurisprudes. Kronman·s 
work on the lawyer-statesman ideal also draws on Aristotle. See generally KRONMAS. 
supra note 8. 
45. Lynn A. Stout. Judges as Altruistic Hierarchs. 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1605. 
1610 (2002). 
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where today it is largely limited to routine cases, and so a 
great deal is permitted to judges. Just how much is permitted 
and how they use their freedoms are the principle concerns of 
this book" (Posner 1 ). 
Posner argues that conventional views of judges. including 
those held by many lawyers and even judges, are lacking in 
reality. Among the guilty parties for this air of unreality are the 
judges themselves, who "are cagey, even coy, in discussing what 
they do" (Posner 2). Another reason for the opacity in the 
judicial function is the difficulty of determining criteria for 
evaluating whether an opinion is "good" or "bad." This leads to 
the book's inquiry into "whether there are grounds for 
confidence in the design of the [judicial] institution and in the 
competence and integrity of the judges who operate it" (Posner 
2). For Posner, this means studying the incentives driving 
judges, "which may in turn depend on the judges' cognition and 
psychology, on how persons are selected (including self-
selected) to be judges, and on the terms and conditions of 
judicial employment" (Posner 5). 
Considering the nature of judicial employment is one of the 
key moves in Posner's book. Judges, he writes. "are all-too-
human workers, responding as other workers do to the 
conditions of the labor market in which they work" (Posner 7). 
At the federal level, lifetime tenure, salary protections, and 
looseness in the agency relationship make the judicial market 
insensitive to many of the standard incentives of the 
employment market. We must therefore look to other, less 
conventional incentives. That includes both the desire for leisure 
and the desire for public recognition (Posner 59-60). Judges may 
also have or develop "a taste for being a good judge'' (Posner 
60). That taste "requires conformity to the accepted norms of 
judging" (Posner 61), which in turn suggests that they will often 
abide by the standard legalist model of judging. 
Often, but not always. Legalist tools quickly fall short in 
deciding difficult cases. And that means that judges, particularly 
appellate judges, "are occasional legislators" (Posner 81 ), 
operating interstitially within the sometimes broad spaces left 
open to them by the law and legal doctrine.4" 
46. Posner is here echoing Justice Holmes's statement that judges "do and must 
legislate. but they can do so onlv interstitially: thev are confined from molar to molecular 
motions." S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen. 244 U.s: 205: 221 (1917) (Holmes. J .. dissenting). 
Whether Posner would emphasize the word ··only" in that sentence. or would emphasize 
the word "must" instead. is a separate question. 
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This leaves much to consider about the nature, scope, and 
proper limits of judges' actions as occasional legislators. One 
response might be to say that, within this open space, "judges are 
[still] motivated by a desire to be thought, not least by 
themselves. as ·good' judges" (Posner 88). But that "leaves the 
matter too vague. For what is a 'good' judge exactly, especially 
when he is legislating?" (Posner 88). 
One piece of the answer that is perhaps more satisfactory is 
to think of judging, whether in the open or closed spaces of the 
law, as a practice. or a "game'' (Posner 91). The game of judging 
involves not just legalism, but "rules of articulation, awareness of 
boundaries and role. process values. a professional culture" 
(Posner 91 ). In this sense, judges operate under some constraints 
even when they decide cases within the area of discretion, albeit 
imperfect constraints that only mark the outer limits of what is 
acceptable. 
Within these broad boundaries. Posner argues that a 
number of sources may influence the judge as occasional 
legislator. These sources include ideology, which Posner 
describes not narrowly. in terms of partisan leanings, but 
broadly. to include a range of personal factors and influences 
(Posner 94). They also include emotion and other 
"psychological variables," which themselves "play a large role 
in ideological formation" (Posner 96). They also include "'good 
judgment.' an elusive faculty best understood as a compound of 
empathy. modesty, maturity, a sense of proportion. balance. a 
recognition of human limitations, sanity, prudence, a sense of 
reality, and common sense'' (Posner 117). To Posner, the fact 
that virtually every lawyer, including the most formalist judges, 
respects the value of good judgment is telling, because if the 
law were purely a mechanical exercise, good judgment would 
be neither necessary nor particularly admirable for judges 
(Posner 117). 
Judicial discretion may be further constrained by a variety 
of other factors. some internal and some external to the act of 
judging itself. Although there are some external constraints on 
judges-including the selection process, the hope of promotion. 
and (for lower court judges) the possibility of appellate review-
these constraints offer only "capacious bounds" on judges 
(Posner 157). Internal constraints on judging are both more 
interesting and. perhaps. more promising. Some of them, 
however. Posner sees as plainly insufficient, or at least far less 
constraining than their fiercest advocates would admit. One such 
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candidate is originalism. Reaching backwards to history, he says, 
"actually enlarges a judge's legislative scope, and not only by 
concealing that he is legislating" (Posner 103). It does so both 
because the more ancient a historical source is, the more ripe it 
is for manipulation, and because the text to which originalists or 
textualists refer rarely states an interpretive rule in anything like 
a clear fashion. Thus, originalism is "an example of bad faith in 
Sartre's sense- bad faith as the denial of freedom to choose, and 
so the shirking of personal responsibility" (Posner 104)!7 
Textualism, another "quintessentially legalist technique[ ]" 
(Posner 192), fails both because it leads to absurd consequences 
and imposes undue corrective costs on legislatures, and because, 
to the extent it is based on the "autistic theory" that legislatures 
lack a collective intent, it is "bad philosophy, bad psychology, 
and bad law" (Posner 194). 
Originalism and textualism are simply subsets of legalism, 
however, and it is legalism that is Posner's true target here. 
"[L]egalist techniques give judicial decision making an 
appearance of intellectual rigor. But in many instances it is just 
an appearance" (Posner 176). The problem is not so much that 
legalism is useless, but that it is insufficient, incomplete, and 
undeserving of the amount of faith placed in it by its strongest 
champions. Some of its tools are not so much constraints as they 
are endlessly contested occasions for debate about their 
application. Take the debate over the value of rules versus 
standards. Rules, Posner suggests, provide the appearance of 
certainty, but because they proceed from incomplete 
information, new facts will either render them inadequate or 
honeycomb them with exceptions over time (Posner 176-78). 
Standards are flexible and adaptive to new information, but of 
course they will sometimes deprive individuals of the certainty 
they need to make plans (Posner 179). In short, judges "typically 
lack the information they would need in order to make an 
objective choice between the two regimes," and perforce will be 
influenced in their choice of a rule or a standard by a variety of 
factors, including personal temperament (Posner 179). 
47. See also Clark & Trubek. supra note 7. at 270--71 (explaining that judges 
··naturally like to clothe their pronouncements in perdurable terms. This may often be 
harmless: it is not. however. when it enables the judge to avoid the necessity of facing the 
consequences of his own decisions''). For more on the relationship between faith and 
law. see Marc 0. DeGirolami. Faith in the Rule of Law. 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 573 
(2008). 
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In a boxing match, the last one left standing is the winner. 
So it is here. Having done his best to lay waste to the claims of 
his competitors, Posner is left with his preferred approach to 
judging: pragmatism. "The word that best describes the average 
American judge at all levels of our judicial hierarchies and yields 
the greatest insight into his behavior is 'pragmatist''' (Posner 
230). For Posner, legal pragmatism means "basing a judicial 
decision on the effects the decision is likely to have, rather than 
on the language of a statute or a case, or more generally on a 
preexisting rule'' (Posner 230; see also Posner 243). 
These sorts of statements are mother's milk for those who 
are generally sympathetic to legal pragmatism. But they will be 
galling to others-especially the hard-core formalist or legalist, 
who wonders whether "legal pragmatism" is simply a 
contradiction in terms. Posner acknowledges the potential 
criticisms of legal pragmatism: that it "lacks moral earnestness'' 
(Posner 250), that it exhibits "a casual attitude toward truth, 
especially moral truth" (Posner 251), that it "allow[s), invite[s]. 
or even command[s] judges to decide cases however they want'' 
(Posner 252). Perhaps most forcefully. critics charge that legal 
pragmatism is "empty," because "it does not weigh the 
consequences of a decision or even specify which consequences 
should be considered" (Posner 240).-lli 
Posner is ultimately unpersuaded by these criticisms. This is 
so partly for positive reasons: he believes that many of the moral 
principles or ends that his critics say he does not provide are 
already obvious, at least in the sense of being uncontroversial 
consensus values in our society (Posner 24~1). But his defense 
of pragmatism rests largely on negative reasons. He does not 
think it "demonstrable that pragmatic adjudication is 'right'" 
(Posner 249-50). Indeed, he acknowledges that legal pragmatism 
''is not a machine for grinding out certifiably correct answers to 
legal questions" (Posner 249). Instead. as the title of the primary 
48. For illustrative criticisms of this sort. see Ronald Dworkin. Darwin's New 
Bulldog. 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718. 1735 (1998) ("[M]oral pragmatism has seemed to 
many critics an empty theory: it encourages forward-looking efforts in search of a future 
it declines to describe."): Ronald Dworkin. Reply. 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 431. 433 (1997) 
("[Posner's] brand of pragmatism is empty because it instructs lawyers to attend to facts 
and consequences. which they already know they should. but does not tell them which 
facts are important or which consequences matter. which is what they worry about."): 
Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove. Can Pragmatism Be Radical7 Richard Posner and 
Legal Pragmatism. 113 YALE L.J. 687. 691 (2003) ("Posner's pragmatism offers little help 
when it comes to evaluating and selecting ends. which is crucial for resolving legal and 
policy disputes."). 
2009] BOOK REVIEWS 113 
chapter in How Judges Think describing legal pragmatism 
suggests, he thinks pragmatism has prevailed on American 
courts as a descriptive matter, and is attractive as a normative 
matter, because it is "inescapable."49 The other theories that he 
assesses, primarily legalist theories, are no more or less likely to 
be "ideological" or "political" than pragmatism itself.50 In short, 
"[t]rying to banish pragmatism must fail because it cannot be 
banished. The only effect of trying to banish it would be to make 
judges even less candid than they are" (Posner 251). Indeed, 
given the likelihood that ideological commitments, policy 
considerations, and personal factors will figure heavily in judicial 
decision making, no matter the method of interpretation being 
employed by the judge, openly pragmatic adjudication may be 
more restrained, or at least more candid, than legalist 
adjudication." 
Although Posner thus thinks that pragmatism is both 
inescapable and normatively preferable, he cautions that legal 
pragmatism should not be severed from some of the same 
considerations that drive legalists. The "good pragmatist 
judge . . . is not a shortsighted pragmatist. . . . But he is a 
constrained pragmatist" (Posner 253). We have already seen that 
Posner believes many external constraints on judges are only 
loose constraints. But he would appear to have greater hope for 
the internal constraints on judges, including pragmatist judges. 
Those constraints include a consideration of the systemic 
consequences of particular actions rather than simply engaging 
in a search for the "right" result in each case (Posner 238-39), 
and the need to conform to the "prevailing norms" of our society 
(Posner 241). Perhaps most importantly, recall Posner's view 
that judges wish to be thought of as "good" judges and will work 
toward that end. This desire constrains the legal pragmatist 
49. See Posner 230 ("Is Pragmatic Adjudication Inescapable?"). 
50. See e.g., Posner 251 ("[J]udges who want to curtail civil liberties have at hand 
legalist tools as powerful as those used by civil libertarians .... Legalism won't resolve 
such disputes."). 
51. See Posner 252 ("Judges are less likely to be drunk with power if they realize 
they are exercising discretion than if they think they are just a transmission belt for 
decisions made elsewhere and so bear no responsibility for any ugly consequences of 
those decisions.''): cf Dan Simon. Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Look 
Through the Lens of Cognitive Psychology. 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1097. 1100. 1138-39 
(2002) (arguing that the cognitive influences on judges that lead them to arrive at "a 
lopsided view of the case that provides stronger argumentative support than the legal 
materials would otherwise provide" may be "exacerbated" by the view in the ''current 
legal atmosphere" that closure. in the sense of a definite and constrained legal outcome 
that is purportedly compelled by reason. "is broadly seen as a factor that enhances the 
acceptability of the decision and promotes the institutional legitimacy of the court"). 
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against being an utterly loose cannon. 'The pragmatist judge 
must play by the rules of the judicial game, just like other 
judges" (Posner 253). Thus, even committed pragmatist judges 
will still be considerably influenced in their work by legalist 
. " practtces.·-
Finally, given the focus of both Powell and Farber and 
Sherry's book, and the focus of this Essay, special note must be 
made of one area where Posner doubts that any method, 
including legal pragmatism, is likely to prove especially 
constraining on judges. That is constitutional law-particularly 
at the Supreme Court level, where the constraints on judicial 
discretion are still looser. He believes the members of the 
Supreme Court, insofar as they are driven mainly by ''the 
political consequences of their decisions," are by definition 
pragmatists (Posner 269); but I doubt he would say they are 
very good pragmatists. "The Court is awash in an ocean of 
discretion," working with little meaningful guidance in difficult 
cases from an "old and vague" Constitution (Posner 272). The 
Supreme Court's primary diet in constitutional cases consists of 
"cases that are at once politically contentious and legalistically 
indeterminate," and its decisions are perforce political in 
nature (Posner 293).53 It is not enough in these circumstances to 
say that a decision "won't write," precisely because the 
indeterminacy of the Constitution and the malleability of the 
legalist approach means that a wide range of opinions will 
write. In any event, the structure of the Court, with its heavy 
reliance on talented if callow law clerks, makes it unlikely that 
this would happen: 
[A] Supreme Court 1 ustice- however questionable his 
position in a particular case might seem to be-can, without 
lifting a pen or touching the computer keyboard, but merely 
by whistling for his law clerks, assure himself that he can 
defend whatever position he wants to take with enough 
professional panache to keep the critics at bay'' (Posner 286). 
In these circumstances, Posner argues, the best we can 
hope for from a Court that is more conscious about the 
pragmatic basis for its decisions will be more careful 
consideration of consequences and more modesty on the part 
52. See Posner 246 ("Just as legal pragmatism incorporates economic analysis of 
law as one of its methods. so. we must not forget. it incorporates legalism as another."). 
53. See also Posner 312 ("A decision taking sides on a moral issue that divides the 
public along approximately party lines and cannot be resolved by expert analysis. let 
alone by conventional legal reasoning. is a political decision.''). 
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of the Court. On the latter front. however, he argues that 
''[j]udicial modesty is not the order of the day in the Supreme 
Court" (Posner 290). On the former front, he argues that even 
the Court's more openly pragmatist judges, like Justice Breyer, 
are inconsistent in their pragmatism and short-sighted in their 
consideration of consequences (Posner 324-42), and that their 
narrow backgrounds and "cosseted" status make it less likely 
that they will be adequate pragmatists and more likely that, 
egos suitably inflated. they will become "moral vanguardist[s]'' 
like Justice Kennedy (Posner 306, 310)."4 He would like to see 
the Court clip its own wings a little, but I doubt he thinks it is 
likely to do so. 
B. POWELL 
At one point in How Judges Think, Posner cites, with 
evident derision, a "purple passage" from Henry Hart's famous 
Harvard Law Review Foreword discussing the role of the 
Supreme Court: 
[T]he Court is predestined in the long run not only by the 
thrilling tradition of Anglo-American law but also by the hard 
facts of its position in the structure of American institutions to 
be a voice of reason, charged with the creative function of 
discerning afresh and of articulating and developing 
impersonal and durable principles of constitutional law." 
This is a fitting jumping-off point to describe H. Jefferson 
Powell's book Constitutional Conscience: The Moral Dimension 
of Judicial Decision, because it seems likely that Powell would 
gladly adopt as his own just about any proposition that Posner 
would view with disdain. Posner serves as a foil in Powell's book, 
because Posner, according to Powell, believes that "a judge has 
no kind of moral or even political duty to abide by constitutional 
text" (Powell 4).'" This runs directly contrary to the argument 
54. Of Justice Kennedy's opinion in Gon::ales ~·. Carhart. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). he 
writes: ··What does it tell us about the commitment to legalism of the four most 
conservative Justices of the Supreme Court that they should have joined such a wild 
opinion?" (Posner 311 n.95). 
55. Henry M. Hart. Jr.. The Supreme Court, 1958 Term: Foreword: The Time Chart 
of the Justices. 73 HARV. L. REV. 84. 99 ( 1959) (quoted in Posner. 301 ). 
56. He bases this on Posner's statement about the pragmatist judge's duty. 
discussed above. to consider systemic consequences when making pragmatist decisions: 
""The point is not that the judge has some kind of moral or even political duty to abide by 
constitutional or statutory text. or by precedent: that would be formalism." Richard A. 
Posner. Pragmarism Versus Purposivism in First Amendmenr Analvsis. 54 STAN. L. REV. 
737. 739 (2002) (quoted in Powe114). · 
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Powell wants to develop over the course of his short but elegant 
book. 
Powell takes as his central text Chief Justice John 
Marshall's statement in Marbury v. Madison concerning the 
importance of the judicial oath in justifying judicial review. 
Because the oath figures in the arguments I develop below, it is 
worth quoting at length, just as Powell does: 
Why otherwise does [the Constitution] direct the judges to 
take an oath to support it? 
This oath certainly applies, in an especial manner, to their 
conduct in their official character. How immoral to impose it 
on them, if they were to be used as the instruments, and the 
knowing instruments. for violating what they swear to 
support? 
The oath of office, too, imposed by the legislature, is 
completely demonstrative of the legislative opinion on this 
subject. It is in these words, "I do solemnly swear that I will 
administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal 
right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and 
impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as 
according to the best of my abilities and understanding, 
agreeably to the constitution of the United States." 
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to 
the constitution of the United States, if that constitution 
forms no rule for his government? If it is closed upon him, 
and cannot be inspected by him? 
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn 
mockery. To prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a 
. 57 
cnme. 
Marshall's invocation of the oath "has not fared well among 
modern scholars, who argue that it begs the real question raised 
by judicial disregard of a statute . . . , or even that the oath 
requirement actually undercuts Marshall's overall reasoning" 
(Powell 2).5s But what matters here is that Marshall thought this 
57. Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137. 179-80 (1803) (quoted in Powell1-
2). As Powell notes. federal judges continue to take essentially the same oath. (Powell 
123 n.2. citing 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006)). 
58. For examples of this criticism, see ALEXANDER BICKEL THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRAI'CH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 7-10 (1962): 
William W. Van Alstyne. A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison. 1969 DUKE L.J. 1. 25-
26. As Powell acknowledges (Powell 123 n.3). this argument stems back almost to the 
date of the Marburv decision itself. See Eakin v. Raub. 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 352 (Pa. 
1825) (Gibson. J .. dissenting) (criticizing Marshall's invocation of the oath in defense of 
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argument mattered. Why did the oath matter so much to 
Marshall? 
Powell's answer forms the core of his book: it matters 
because 
the practice of judicial review rests not only on the structural 
features of the American Constitution that [Marshall] 
emphasized earlier in his opinion ... but flows as well from 
the judge's individual obligations as a moral actor. [Marshall] 
perceived in the oath requirement a juxtaposition of the 
judiciary's governmental role and the judge's personal 
conscience, one that gives moral weight to the individual's 
exercise of the power of judicial review that the community 
has entrusted to him (Powell 2-3) 
Thus, there is an irreducibly moral and individual 
component to the judicial function in constitutional cases. Powell 
asserts that "Chief Justice Marshall was right to believe that the 
exercise of the power of judicial review presents profound moral 
questions for those who wield it.'' (Powell 9). Any effort to 
interpret the Constitution leaves the judge in a position to 
exercise good or bad faith in his decision-making process. Once 
that occurs, "we clearly have entered the realm of moral 
obligation to which Marshall appealed in his discussion of the 
judicial oath." (Powell 10). He writes: 
Our actual practices of interpreting the Constitution 
presuppose the existence of a moral dimension to those 
practices: put another way, much of what we say and do in 
constitutional interpretation is meaningless-a "solemn 
mockery" indeed-if constitutional decision is in fact free of 
the sort of moral commitment that Marshall invoked in his 
opinion in Marbury (Powell 10).w 
Powell offers two central premises for his book. The first is 
that there are, in fact, bases for "moral or ethical evaluations'' of 
constitutional law, although they may be fairly thin (Powell 6). 
They include the possibility of good and bad faith that I noted 
above. He takes this as a governing assumption of American law 
judicial review on the grounds that "(t]he oath to support the constitution is not peculiar 
to the judges. but is taken indiscriminately by every officer of the government. and is 
designed rather as a test of the political principles of the man. than to bind the officer in 
the discharge of his duty"). 
59. See also Powell 12 ("The moral circumstances of a judge asked to exercise the 
power of judicial review involve considerations of constitutional structure and of what it 
means to call a court's judgment a ·decision according to law· that are inextricably linked 
with his or her moral choices."). 
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and society, and says that, "[f]or anyone who sincerely disagrees 
with it, I have nothing (in this work) to say." (Powell 7). His 
second premise is that ''constitutional law's central function is to 
provide a means of resolving political conflict that accepts the 
inevitability and persistence of such conflict rather than the 
possibility of consensus or even broad agreement on many 
issues" (Powell 7). The means of resolving these conflicts are 
simply the stuff of "our actual, traditional practices of 
constitutional interpretation. A substantial divergence between 
what constitutional decision makers say they are doing and what 
they actually are or are perceived to be doing would undermine 
in the long term the value of constitutional law to American 
society" (Powell 9).60 
The remainder of the book rests on these premises. Powell 
wants to argue that "[t]he key to understanding the moral 
dimension of constitutional decision ... is the demand it places 
on the conscience of the judge" (Powell 10). In each case, the 
judge "can act in accordance with the language and ideals of our 
traditional practices only by deciding in good faith, according to 
her conscience" (Powell 11 ). Powell's concern is to "explore[ ] 
what it means to have a good (or bad) conscience in 
constitutional decision-making" (Powell 11 ). A host of virtues 
are involved in good-faith constitutional decision making, and 
the need for these "constitutional virtues ... is implicit in our 
constitutional practices" (Powell 11 ). Sounding a note similar to 
his invocation of Marshall's "solemn mockery" language, he 
adds: "Without them, constitutional law as this society has 
traditionally understood it and our language today still implies is 
impossible'' (Powell11; see also Powell42). 
A variety of interpretive practices are argued by their 
adherents to eliminate precisely this sense of weighty moral 
obligation, by removing any significant discretion-and thus any 
particular need for good or bad faith-from the decision maker, 
whose task is rendered mechanical and amoral. Powell, like 
Posner, will have none of these arguments. Textualism will not 
succeed as a response, both because it does not describe the 
judges' actual practice and because the (generally 
indeterminate) "constitutional text itself presupposes that its 
interpreters will go outside the four corners of its language.'' 
60. Again. he invites anyone who disagrees with him on this premise to take his 
business elsewhere. See id. (''[I]f this last assumption seems wrong or wildly implausible 
to the reader. this book will not attempt to persuade him or her otherwise."). 
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(Powell 44 ). Comprehensive theories of constitutional 
interpretation, which seek "an intellectual technology ... that 
can prevent judges from importing politics (or the wrong sort of 
politics) into constitutional law." are also doomed. because none 
of them is persuasively drawn from within the four corners of the 
Constitution itself (Powell 46-47). No theory can "exclud[ e] 
politics from constitutional law," which leaves us with only 
"moral, not technical" means of "achieving fidelity to the rules 
of the [judicial] game" (Powell 47). In short. constitutional 
interpretation is ''intrinsically a moral activity." albeit one that 
Powell sees as relying not on external moral criteria but on 
moral criteria that are "internal to the game" of judging (Powell 
52-53). 
What are those criteria? Drawing on a number of what he 
considers exemplars of moral judging-including. most 
interestingly, a legal opinion written not by a Justice but by an 
executive branch officiaL Amos Akerman. who served as 
Ulysses S. Grant's Attorney General (Powell 56-79)- Powell 
identifies several such criteria. These criteria do not reduce to an 
algorithm that will spit out correct answers: rather, in the open 
spaces, constitutional decision making must "be governed only 
by conscience, by a dutiful attempt to resolve the conflict of 
constitutional provisions. interests. and principles as seems most 
proper to the decision maker" (Powell 79). It requires the 
decision maker "to come to a moral conclusion that cannot be, 
by definition, anything other than a question of degree" (Powell 
79). Still, Powell thinks that the American constitutional system 
does "generate a ... set of virtues[ ] that define and inform fair 
play in constitutional decision-making" (Powell 82). Without 
tying himself too strongly to the project of virtue ethics, Powell 
raids its larder to outline some "habits of mind and will that our 
practices demand we develop in order that the Constitution may 
be interpreted" in a virtuous fashion (Powell 82-83). 
Powell identifies the first constitutional virtue as "faith." 
Faith follows from his view that the Constitution is an intelligible 
document, not simply an excuse for the exercise of raw and 
unconstrained power: were it otherwise. "American 
constitutional interpretation as socially understood [would be] 
impossible" (Powell 85). Faith-or good faith-thus demands 
"both an acceptance of the Constitution's intelligibility ... and 
an undertaking to govern oneself as a constitutional actor in 
accordance with the Constitution's intelligible meaning" (Powell 
85). 
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Although he believes the Constitution is intelligible, Powell 
also acknowledges that it is ambiguous, and thus that its 
interpretation is open to uncertainty (Powell 87). Accordingly. 
"if constitutional interpretation is not to devolve into cynical 
posturing" in the presence of this interpretive ambiguity, 
constitutional decision makers "must display the constitutional 
virtues of integrity and candor: integrity in coming to decision. 
candor in the presentation of arguments that often can be said to 
be only the interpreter's best judgment, not the text's 
unmistakable bidding, on how to enforce the Constitution" 
(Powell 88). Importantly. if controversially, Powell argues that 
integrity, by demanding that judges, "as a matter of personal and 
institutional morality, ... treat the Constitution not as a tool that 
they can use to achieve whatever goals they choose on other 
grounds. but itself as the ground for their decisions," precludes 
the "instrumentalist view of law of the sort that Judge Posner 
and others advocate'' (Powell 91). On this view, judicial integrity 
is apparently anti-pragmatic. 
Another constitutional virtue is humility. Humility, which is 
not to be confused with timidity or self-doubt, is "the habit of 
doubting that the Constitution resolves divisive political or social 
issues as opposed to requiring them to be thrashed out through 
the processes of ordinary, revisable politics" (Powell 93-94). It 
leads to "a humble or limited conception of the role of the 
Constitution. of the Supreme Court, and of one's own 
constitutional convictions" (Powell 94 ). 
Powell's next constitutional virtue, "the virtue of 
acquiescence'' (Powell 99), seeks to find space in constitutional 
decision making for the recognition of the wisdom of the ages 
represented by stare decisis, without treating it as a straitjacket. 
Acquiescence is "the disposition to accept the premises of 
existing decisions even when they are not our own premises, to 
accept that a question can be settled and ought to be taken as a 
starting point for further constitutional thought, not as an 
opportunity for endless reargument" (Powell 99). It requires 
judges to see themselves as existing within a substantial 
constitutional tradition, but cannot free them from the 
obligation to make good-faith decisions for themselves; it is, he 
writes, "the exercise of a moral obligation rather than obedience 
to an invariant rule of decision" (Powell 99-100). 
This completes the list of "Powellian" constitutional virtues. 
Again, it is important to note that Powell sees them both as 
centered in the individual virtues of constitutional decision 
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makers (Powell 101 ), and essential to the system as a whole: 
"Without those virtues as ideals, and as realities, to the extent 
that is possible for fallible human beings, American 
constitutionalism is a fraud" (Powell 100). These virtues are 
necessarily and ineluctably moral in nature: "There is no escape, 
not even for legal instrumentalists such as Judge Posner, from 
individual moral responsibility in constitutional law" (Powell 
107). 
Powell concludes on a note that again sounds in the 
inevitability and necessity of conscience and moral choice in the 
exercise of constitutional decision-making authority. He writes: 
Our constitutional practices ... assume, in both the language 
we use and the authority we grant them, that constitutional 
decisions can be made through a principled evaluation of 
constitutional arguments-and not on the basis of the will, the 
preferences or the extraconstitutional values of the decision 
makers. Those practices can only make sense, therefore, if 
such a mode of principled constitutional decision is possible. 
The only possible locus for such a mode of decision lies in the 
constitutional conscience of the decision maker, a conscience 
shaped by the virtues that correspond to the basic 
presuppositions of the Constitution (Powell 114 ). 
C. FARBERANDSHERRY 
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry's book. Judgment Calls: 
Principle and Politics in Constitutional Law, requires less space 
to summarize, and may suffer from the fate of the middle child 
who receives less attention than her older or younger siblings. 
This is a consequence of the fact that, in many respects, 
Judgment Calls splits the difference between Posner and 
Powell's books. Like How Judges Think, it draws (more lightly, 
however) on various internal and external constraints on 
judging. Also like Posner, it advocates a form of judicial 
pragmatism. Like Constitutional Conscience, however, it offers a 
somewhat romantic faith in the rule of law and the possibility of 
something other than purely "political" constitutional decision 
making, and attempts to provide a list of virtues that might guide 
judges in this effort. Whether this approach succeeds in 
mediating between the two extremes, or whether it is bound to 
satisfy neither side in the debate, is a question I take up in Part 
III. First, though, a brief summary is needed. 
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In some ways, Judgment Calls could have been titled The 
New "New Legal Process. ''" 1 The book announces itself as a 
defense of constitutional judicial review (Farber & Sherry ix-x. 
3). but that defense employs values that are characteristic of the 
Legal Process school."2 Unlike the Legal Process schooL 
however. Farber and Sherry reject the Legal Process faith in the 
notion that "reason will necessarily produce 'right answers' if 
judges are sufficiently smart and sufficiently principled" (Farber 
& Sherry ix-x). Decisions involving the ambiguities of the 
Constitution "inevitably involve judgment calls, and reasonable 
people will sometimes disagree about the best answers" (Farber 
& Sherry ix-x). Like Posner and Powell, they believe that no 
comprehensive theory of judicial review can dissolve this 
problem; all of them share a "common inability to constrain 
judicial decision-making" (Farber & Sherry 27)."' With Powell, 
they conclude that no theory of constitutional interpretation can 
"purg[ e] the exercise of judgment" (Farber & Sherry 29). 
What does judicial review consist of. if constraining theories 
of constitutional interpretation are ultimately unavailing? Is law 
nothing more than politics, as the attitudinalists would have it? 
Farber and Sherry deny this. Instead, they say. 
Constitutional decisions can be judicial and principled (and 
thus firmly rooted in the rule of law rather than in politics). 
as well as judicious and pragmatic (and thus range beyond 
the narrow confines of text and original intent). Good 
constitutional adjudication should be neither the mechanical 
application of formal rules nor the freewheeling exercise of 
pure politics (Farber & Sherry 4). 
This is not to say that constitutional decision-making is 
purely objective. A host of factors, including judges' 
backgrounds and political perspectives, may influence their 
decision-making in the open spaces of discretion. Nor do they 
reject any role for "creative statesmanship" in judging (Farber & 
61. That title. alas. had already been taken by Nicholas Zeppos. See Nicholas S. 
Zeppos. Justice Scalia's Textualism: The New "New Legal Process," 12 CARDOZO L. 
REv.1597 (1991). 
62. See, e.g .. Farber & Sherry ix-x: 
Our major aim is to explain and defend the thesis that even in hard cases. 
reasoned legal decisions are possible .... We believe ... that the reasoned 
exercise of discretion is not an oxymoron. In this. we follow in the footsteps of 
the old ·Jegal process· theorists of ihe 1950s. 
63. See also Farber & Sherry 26-29: see generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA 
SHERRY. DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAI"'TY: THE MISGL"IDED QUEST FOR 
CO"iSTITl'TIONAL FOl'NDA TIONS (2002). 
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Sherry 6). But the discretion exercised by constitutional judges is 
bounded by internal and external constraints. Those constraints 
"make it possible for the rule of law. rather than lawless fiat. to 
operate in a world that lacks the comforting certainty of 
mathematical reasoning" (Farber & Sherry 6). They make it 
possible to judge constitutional decisions on the basis of a 
"standard of reasonableness." and to believe that this standard is 
capable of being achieved (Farber & Sherry 4). 
The middle section of Judgment Calls, before examining the 
constraints on judges. attempts to identify criteria by which 
sound judging can be identified in the absence of comprehensive 
theories of constitutional law. These are fairly broad criteria. but 
Farber and Sherry argue that nothing more constraining or 
mechanical is possible: the inability to define solutions to hard 
problems in uniform or perfectly predictable ways is "simply 
part of the human condition" (Farber & Sherry 37). 
At the same time. they argue that it is not enough simply 
to say that judges exercise discretion and leave it at that. This is 
how they characterize Posner's descrigtion of constitutional 
decision making in the Supreme Court. In their view, this '"if 
not the heavens, then the abyss' syndrome" is mistaken because 
"it refuses to see the middle ground between complete 
constraint and boundless leeway" in constitutional adjudication 
(Farber & Sherry 39). It is wrong both because it does not fit 
with judges' own perceptions of their work, in which they 
believe they are working "'inside the law' for concepts and 
values''"' (Farber & Sherry 39), and because simply referring to 
judges as gap-fillers within the discretionary spaces "does not 
provide enough of a basis for evaluating judicial decisions.·· 
(Farber & Sherry 39). They believe it is necessary to offer 
guideposts that enable a "positive description of judging," one 
that "offer[ s] both guidelines for judges who honor the rule of 
law and criteria for evaluating judicial decision-making'' 
(Farber & Sherry 6). 
Farber and Sherry point to several such criteria. The first, 
drawing on administrative law models for the evaluation of 
agency exercises of discretion (Farber & Sherry 40-42). is the 
64. See Farber & Sherry 38 (quoting Posner's statement that the Court is swimming 
in an "'ocean of discretion"'). 
65. As Frank Cross notes. Posner. in contrast. ··cautions against overreliance on 
such internal perspectives:· Cross. supra note 16. at 184 n.6 (quoting Posner 2) 
("Biographies are more reliable than autobiographies. and cats are not consulted on the 
principles of feline psychology.··). 
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need for "[r]easoned justifications, based on relevant factors" 
(Farber & Sherry 43). Reasoned elaboration is, of course, one of 
the hallmarks of Legal Process thinking."" In contrast to Posner, 
they believe the requirement of reasoned elaboration provides a 
useful psychological constraint on judges, who may find that a 
decision "won't write" in a way that conforms with this 
requirement (Farber & Sherry 44). 
Because reasoned elaboration cannot be distilled into a set 
of "clear and formulaic" limits, it must perforce involve the 
exercise of judgment (Farber & Sherry 52). Farber and Sherry 
acknowledge that judgment is a capacious concept, and one that 
inspires unease among many legal scholars as a basis for 
evaluating sound constitutional decision-making (Farber & 
Sherry 55). I do not think this chapter will change the doubters' 
minds. On the other hand, they argue, also correctly, that 
judgment is a familiar, if difficult to define, term for American 
lawyers and judges (Farber & Sherry 54). 
What Farber and Sherry mean by judgment, precisely, is 
difficult to discern, although they might argue that this is 
inevitable. They argue that judgment involves knowing what 
constitutes a reasonable or plausible legal argument in light of 
··precedent. constitutional history, and public values" (Farber & 
Sherry 55). "[M]ore than one reasonable outcome may exist" in 
some cases, although. unlike Posner, they think such cases 
constitute an "unusual event" rather than a "routine 
phenomenon." (Farber & Sherry 55). Importantly, "[j]udgment 
can be independent and objective," in the sense of "being 
properly responsive to opposing evidence and arguments and 
less likely to succumb to the various cognitive biases that can 
negatively affect decision-making" (Farber & Sherry 56). 
Drawing in fairly general terms on psychology, they argue that a 
number of factors in the judicial environment, including judges' 
accountability to unknown evaluators (unknown because a judge 
cannot be certain which panel will review her decision), 
heterogeneity in the pool of judges, and the development of 
critical thinking skills, suggest that "judges are likely to be about 
as good as possible ... at making reasoned legal judgments""7 
66. See, e.g. G. Edward White. The Evolwion of Reasoned Elaboration: 
Jurispmdential Criticism and Social Change. 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973): see also NEIL 
0CXBL'RY. PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205-300 (1995). 
67. See also Farber & Sherry 56-58. This chapter is. it should be noted. very thinly 
sourced compared to. say. Posner's use of the psychological literature on judging. Farber 
and Sherry rely almost entirely on a couple of sources discussing expert judgment in 
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(Farber & Sherry 56). They conclude that the psychological 
literature to some extent redeems the view that legal judgment 
can be improved by careful attention to '"craft values' or 
'professionalism'" in judging (Farber & Sherry 58). 
In addition to these "intangible psychological factors," 
Farber and Sherry argue that several "internal and external 
constraints on judges" also help to "keep them from lapsing into 
arbitrariness or purely political decisions'' (Farber & Sherry 58-
59). The first is precedent. Like Powell, they believe that 
precedent strengthens the integrity and legitimacy of the judicial 
system by "transform[ing] the Court from an ever-changing 
collection of individual judges to an institution, one which is 
capable of building a continuing body of law rather than merely 
a succession of one-time rulings" (Farber & Sherry 71). They 
stress that respect for precedent not only adds to judicial 
efficiency, but also reinforces humility, teaching us that "[i]t 
would be arrogant to assume that we alone have access to 
wisdom" (Farber & Sherry 70). 
A second set of constraints arises from the structure of the 
judicial process itself. That includes the tiered and multi-member 
nature of the state and federal court systems, in which the 
diversity of judicial personnel staffing the courts means that "the 
only commonality" these judges will have "is their mutual faith 
in the rule of law and their sworn oath to uphold it." and in 
which they will "have to appeal to this shared vision" in order to 
persuade their colleagues and have their decisions stick (Farber 
& Sherry 89). The Supreme Court, which sits at the top of the 
judicial hierarchy, may seem more loosely constrained by this 
phenomenon, but Farber and Sherry argue that even Supreme 
Court Justices must persuade each other. and must persuade 
general. and neglect the growing literature suggesting that judges can in fact suffer from 
significant cognitive biases. See. e.g .. supra note 39 (collecting sources). In the 
bibliographical essay that follows the main text. they add: ""We would be remiss if we did 
not mention that there is a substantial body of literature suggesting that judges suffer 
from the same cognitive biases as most people. and are therefore no better at making 
sound decisions·· (Farber & Sherry 188). They argue that this literature has been 
··persuasively critiqued"" by Gregory Mitchell in a single article. See Gregorv Mitchell. 
Why Law and Economics· Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behm·iora/ La11· 
and Economics. 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002) (cited in Farber & Sherry 188). With respect. this 
seems to me both an inadequate response to the literature on cognitive biases in judges. 
and a curious one. since. as the title of his article suggests. Mitchell is arguing by 
implication for the retention of rational actor models of decision making. which I should 
think would be both equally unrealistic to Farber and Sherrv and normativelv 
unattractive. to the extent that they are arguing for a non-instrument~! view of judging. · 
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lower court judges if they wish to avoid having their decisions 
resisted (Farber & Sherry 89-90). 
Another systemic constraint is the need to deliberate. 
Deliberation not only improves decisions (Farber & Sherry 90)."'' 
but also implicates "the judge's own self-respect," and thus 
serves as a constraint on arbitrary decisions (Farber & Sherry 90, 
quotation marks and citation omitted). Interestingly for our 
purposes. Farber and Sherry argue that deliberation is also a 
means of '"shap[ing] the character of judges" (Farber & Sherry 
91 ). It fosters a kind of "'judicial character" that is open to new 
ideas and to criticism, that is both confident and humble at the 
same time (Farber & Sherry 91 ). Still other structural constraints 
exist, including even the presence of law clerks. which provides a 
push-and-pull element in the judicial function that may "reduc[ e] 
the likelihood of weak or unreasoned decisions.·· (Farber & 
Sherry 94). More broadly, the trappings of legal pomp-the 
robe. the bench. the genuflection of the courtroom audience-
impress upon the judges the seriousness of their role and 
"'contribute[ ] to fostering adherence to the core principles of the 
rule of law." (Farber & Sherry 94 ). Public scrutiny of judicial 
opinions also assists in reinforcing judicial integrity. (Farber & 
Sherry 94-96). Interestingly. however. Farber and Sherry argue 
that the courts' professional critics should refrain from criticizing 
judges for possessing political motives, because it may 
"'incrementally persuade[ ] the public or the judges themselves 
that law is abollt politics and therefore that we should expect 
judges to be blatantly political. ""y (Farber & Sherry 96). 
Another constraint. transparency. Farber and Sherry deem 
"perhaps the least discussed but the most important'' constraint 
on judges (Farber & Sherry 97). Like Powell, they describe the 
transparency constraint as the demand that "[a] judge's written 
opinions ... fairly reflect her actual reasoning'' (Farber & Sherry 
97). It requires that judges both be honest with others about 
their grounds for decision. and attempt to be sufficiently honest 
with themselves about their grounds for decision. It is "both an 
internal and an external constraint," because it subjects judges' 
actual reasons to public scrutiny but also demands that they face 
up to their own reasons (Farber & Sherry 98). 
6R. 8111 see Posner 301--D7 (arguing that deliberation is largely non-existent on 
multi-member courts and is unlikelv to count for much in the absence of shared premises. 
which are less likely to be present .in .. political .. cases). Farber and Sherry acknowledge 
this possibility and call it .. worrisome if true .. (Farber & Sherry 92). 
69. See also Stout. s11pra note 45. at 1625 (making a similar argument). 
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Farber and Sherry also believe that a series of internal 
constraints helps to make sound reasoned judgment possible. 
The most familiar and the most central is the presence of 
professional norms in the law (Farber & Sherry 113-15). For the 
most part, however, their discussion of internal constraints on 
judging is more criticaL and they offer a series of suggested 
structural reforms to buttress the internal constraints, by 
enhancing judges' sense of judicial professionalism and integrity 
and dissuading them from adopting a habit of thinking of law as 
politics. For example, they suggest that the Court might hear 
more cases, voluntarily or as a result of congressional expansion 
of the Court's now effectively non-existent mandatory docket, 
and that Justices might be required to ride circuit. Both 
measures are intended to force the Court to consider more 
routine and uncontroversial cases, and more non-constitutional 
cases, thus encouraging them to adopt a habit of thinking in 
apolitical and professional terms (Farber & Sherry 120). 
Farber and Sherry close with a set of case studies that they 
argue demonstrate the possibility of evaluating legal decisions 
for their adherence to, or departure from, the standards they set 
for reasoned legal judgment. To take one example, they argue 
that Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld70 
is commendable because it makes the most open and "serious 
effort to reconcile the [conflicting] interests" between liberty and 
security that the Court confronted in that case (Farber & Sherry 
137). It is not perfect, in their view, but it is ''admirable for its 
principled stand against arbitrary arrests and for its effort to find 
a solution that also respected our constitutional history and the 
need for some flexibility in protecting national security" (Farber 
& Sherry 137). They also treat the votes in that case as "evidence 
that ideology is not everything. even in the hardest constitutional 
cases" (Farber & Sherry 138). 
Farber and Sherry conclude with a "perhaps deceptively 
simple" prescription: "Respect precedent, exercise good 
judgment, provide reasoned explanations, deliberate with your 
colleagues, and keep in mind the possible responses of critics. In 
our view, the first virtue of judges is prudence" (Farber & Sherry 
167). But prudence is "not enough to make a great judge. For 
that, vision is also required-not in the sense of a comprehensive 
roadmap, but in an ability to sense the deep constitutional values 
underlying a hard issue" (Farber & Sherry 167). They describe 
70. 542 u.s. 507 (2004). 
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constitutional decision-making as "a quest to temper politics 
with law," and argue that "that quest is not quixotic" (Farber & 
Sherry 168). They write, responding to their early critics and 
perhaps anticipating others: 
We envision a Court that respects precedent, seeks to 
articulate constitutional values and reconcile them when they 
conflict. and explains the reasons for its decisions clearly and 
honestly. We do not believe that this is a utopian vision, 
though it is utopian to expect it to be satisfied every day in 
every case. We also reject the view, expressed by some who 
have read our manuscript, that this is an inherently 
ideological vision suitable only for the politically wishy-washy 
(Farber & Sherry 168). 
* * * * * 
This brings a perhaps overlong summary of these three 
books to a close. We have seen that these books, despite areas of 
overlapping consensus, ultimately represent three points on a 
spectrum of views about judging and judicial character. Posner 
would not deny the role played by judicial character, but neither 
would he romanticize it; the character of judges, for him, can 
best be seen as a mix of factors, including professionalism and 
the wish to be viewed by their peers as professionals, but also 
including factors of personal background and political ideology. 
The best hope for sound judgment-sound in the sense of 
contributing to sensible policy outcomes, taking into account 
relevant systemic considerations-is a thoroughgoing. if (for 
consequentialist reasons) constrained, brand of pragmatism. 
Powell's is a far more idealistic vision. Like Mark Twain on 
infant baptism. he believes in the possibility of a "constitutional 
conscience" because he has seen it, 71 in the legal interpreters he 
views as paragons of sound constitutional decision making. But 
he is less concerned, perhaps, with the possibility of the 
constitutional virtues than he is with their necessity. Without 
them. constitutional law is a sham and an impossibility. For 
Powell, the very nature of constitutional law renders the practice 
ineluctably moral in nature; judges can choose to exercise good 
or bad faith in carrying out that moral purpose, but they cannot 
avoid the moral element of that choice. 
71. Twain. asked whether he believed in infant baptism. was said to have replied. 
··Believe in it'? Hell. I've seen it done!"" See, e.g.. TOM QUIRK. MARK TWAIN AND 
HUMAN NATURE 1 (2007). 
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Farber and Sherry bring up the middle. Their vision of 
constitutional judging is surely far more idealistic and romantic, 
and in that sense far closer to Powell, than that of Posner. For if 
Posner thinks "objective" or legalist judging is unlikely in the 
most difficult common-law or statutory cases, he thinks it is all 
the more exotic in constitutional law, the subject of Farber and 
Sherry's book; and even here, as we have seen, Farber and 
Sherry think "[j]udgment can be independent and objective" 
(Farber & Sherry 56). Their Polonian list of the qualities that 
comprise good judgment is far closer to Powell than to Posner, 
and although they call themselves pragmatists, they reject the 
kind of instrumentalism that Posner sees as all that we have left 
when law is stripped of its illusions. But they resemble Posner in 
their rejection of comprehensive theories that promise to 
provide meaningful constraint in the face of an aged and 
ambiguous Constitution, and in their attempt to draw on the 
social sciences and on institutional factors to find means of 
constraining the judicial function and staving off cognitive bias 
and raw politics. Their heads are in the stars, but they have a 
foot planted, albeit unsteadily, on the ground. 
III. BETWEEN THE JUDICIAL "IS" AND "OUGHT": A 
CRITICAL EVALUATION 
All of these books share some common themes, and all of 
them make valuable contributions to the debate over judicial 
character and the judicial role. In this Part, however, I offer a 
more critical assessment of these books. That assessment will in 
turn help lay the foundation for a more constructive effort, in 
Part IV, to find a via media in thinking about these issues, one 
that is based explicitly on a combination of virtue jurisprudence 
and the role of the judicial oath. To do so, I consider what the 
books under review lack-what may strike their readers as 
unsatisfying in their account of the real and the ideal worlds of 
judging in general, and constitutional judging in particular. 
As I will make clear, I find Powell's book, bracing as it is, 
too airy in its account of judging, and I believe Farber and 
Sherry's book shares this problem, notwithstanding its effort to 
paint a more realistic picture of judging. Both books give a fine 
account of the judicial "ought," as it were, but an insufficient 
account of the judicial "is.'' Posner's book, on the other hand, is 
largely persuasive in its account of judging as a lived reality.7c 
72. But see Michael J. Gerhardt. How a Judge Thinks. 93 MINN. L. REV. 2185 
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What is missing here, perhaps, is a sense of the "ought" that 
might complement his description of the judicial "is.'' Largely 
absent from Posner's book is the quality of idealism and moral 
clarity that is the beating heart of Powell's book-although I 
doubt that Posner would be especially disheartened by this 
criticism. Still, there are aspects of How Judges Think that may 
open a space for a more constructive and somewhat more 
idealistic vision of judging. They may be mere traces, but, with 
some supplementation, they may prove enough to build on. 
Begin, then, with Powell and Constitutional Conscience. 
That this is an intentionally idealistic account of constitutional 
judging is apparent from the very first pages of Powell's book, in 
which he rejects those who would embrace an ideological 
explanation for constitutional judging because "it seems the 
product of hard-bitten realism," and instead urges us to see the 
constitutional tradition as one involving "the faithful 
interpretation of a fundamental law that is this republic's chosen 
means of self-governance" (Powell ix-x). He adds that the theme 
of the book will be "[h]ow we can believe that to be so in the 
face of all the evidence to the contrary" (Powell x). 
Powell's insistence on focusing on the judicial "ought" 
rather than the judicial "is" is equally apparent in his refusal to 
engage with anyone who objects to some of the central, and 
decidedly idealistic, premises of his book. Thus, in placing good 
faith at the center of his account, he says brusquely that he has 
"nothing ... to say" to any skeptics (Powell 7). Similarly, he 
brushes off anyone who might doubt the destructive force of a 
"substantial divergence between what constitutional decision 
makers say they are doing and what they actually are or are 
perceived to be doing." (Powell 9). And he offers a blunt 
response to any argument that the judicial virtues he recounts 
might not be as essential as all that, arguing that to ignore them 
would make "constitutional law as this society has traditionally 
understood it and our language still implies . . . impossible" 
(Powellll ). 
Powell is commendably clear about the idealistic premises 
of his book. But although he would evidently view too much 
cynicism about the judicial process as corrosive of the 
constitutional enterprise, I think it is rather his idealism that 
proves corrosive, or at least tends to diminish the value of this 
(2009) (disagreeing with Posner's explanation of judging): Levi. supra note 24 (disputing 
Posner's descriptive account of judging). 
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work. I agree with Powell that there is an irreducible moral 
component to the act of judging. But to say this is not to say that 
judging that falls short of Powell's high standards, or even that 
rejects some of his key premises, will not be recognizable as 
judging or will destroy the constitutional project. We live in such 
a world, and however disenchanted Powell may be by it, it 
continues to turn. Moreover. to construct a thin account of 
judicial virtue without a thicker account of the real world of 
judging, and the actual and inglorious determinants of judicial 
behavior, risks leaving us with a very thin broth indeed. 
Let me take these complaints in order. Again, as we have 
seen, Powell builds his foundation on certain premises about the 
necessity of good faith and integrity, by which he means that 
there should be no disjunction between what judges do and what 
they say they are doing. and offers the back of his hand to 
anyone who disagrees. He derides the ideological view of 
judging as, in essence, being attractive only to the sort of 
sophomoric person who sees it as "the product of hard-bitten 
realism" (Powell ix). He does not name Posner here, but it is 
evident he has him in mind. And he suggests that attitudinal 
views like those that have "many adherents in political science 
departments, and not a few (usually unacknowledged) within 
law faculties," are "a recipe for personal moral catastrophe" 
(Powell 51). What he does not do is engage with these views, let 
alone refute them. As Posner's book demonstrates, there is an 
ample literature that offers at least partial support to the 
attitudinalist model of judging, and particularly constitutional 
judging, which is less constrained than other areas of law. From 
reading Powell's book, however, one would barely be aware of 
the existence of this literature, except in a general sense that 
something bad and misguided has happened somewhere in the 
academic literature. 
Powell is aware of this literature. of course. 73 But his 
response is a normative one and not a descriptive one. It denies 
that those conversations are worth having. More than that, it 
suggests that to plunge too deeply into these discussions is to risk 
73. Although he does not seem very happy about it. See H. Jefferson Powell, A 
Response to Professor Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial 
Decisionmaking?. 58 DL'KE L.J. 1725. 1725 (2009): 
When I do dip into [empirical works]. I often find them rather difficult or even 
alien. both in style and in focus. I also find them frustrating: the empiricists 
frequently appear to be battling a formalist straw man who believes that law can 
be done by following rules that do not allow for discretion in their 
interpretation or application. I do not know anyone who thinks that. 
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halting the enterprise of constitutional law as we know it. It is an 
"ought" response to an "is" question. Powell's answer to the 
question of what judges actually do is like that of the religious 
believer who thinks that God must exist because life without 
God would be unthinkable. That is no kind of proof. 
In any event, is the more "hard-bitten" conception of the 
judicial role unthinkable? Does it really render constitutional 
law as we know it impossible or meaningless? I very much doubt 
it. It may leave constitutional law in a rather chastened and 
disenchanted position. It may suggest that the most sweeping 
and grand discussions that we have been accustomed to put in 
terms of constitutional law are, to some extent, window dressing. 
It may even render constitutional law "an exercise in hypocrisy" 
(Powell ix), a prospect that Powell dreads, although he might 
have remembered the old saw about hypocrisy being the tribute 
that vice pays to virtue. But that does not render it impossible; it 
simply re-describes what we have been up to over the last two 
centuries in less romantic terms. Indeed, Powell's failure to 
genuinely engage the attitudinalists, and others, such as Posner, 
who have described constitutional judging as a "political'' 
exercise, leaves him in something of a bind. On the one hand, he 
apparently finds something of value in the constitutional 
enterprise as it has unfolded over time. On the other, if the 
attitudinalists are right-and Powell never shows that they are 
not-then this is simply what we have been doing all along. 
Powell might respond that we have simply lost our way; that 
the constitutional virtues exercised by men like Marshall and 
Akerman have been lost somewhere along the journey. This 
declinist view is apparent in his sympathetic treatment of the 
possibility that the "effort to exclude politics from law by moral 
effort" is "in an advanced stage of decay at present" (Powell 49-
50). This is a typical view in constitutional scholarship, which is a 
field of nostalgists, who hearken back to some lost age- the 
Marshall Court, the Warren Court, the Founding era-or some 
individual beau ideal judge and sigh, "There were giants in those 
days .... "74 But it is mistaken. The giants were not so giant, and 
in any event they hardly carried the whole enterprise on their 
own shoulders; they worked with any number of partners whose 
own talents were no greater or lesser than those of our present 
74. Cf Bruce Ackerman. A Generation of Betrayal?. 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1519, 
1528 (1997) (calling the present generation of political leaders a "generation of midgets." 
in contrast to those "Americans who actually accomplished something very great indeed 
in the annals of the Republic"). 
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constitutional interpreters. Quite apart from the serious question 
whether Marshall is really an exemplar of good-faith judging, 
one Marshall, or Akerman. does not a Golden Age make. 
Unless Powell can show us that constitutional law. in practice, 
was ever a completely morally serious enterprise-and he 
neither can nor does do so-then we must conclude that 
constitutional law has always survived as an enterprise despite 
the possibility that judges have been influenced all along by their 
political priors. 
So there is a gap between the ··ought" that Powell urges and 
the "is'' we have had all along. That might not be a fatal blow, if 
we could become convinced that Powell's vision is possible in the 
real world of judging. But that real world plays a vanishingly 
small role in Powell's book. It is not just that he fails to seriously 
engage with the attitudinalist model of judging: it is that he fails 
to engage with almost any empirical or psychological insights 
into judging. Missing almost entirely from Constitutional 
Conscience is any descriptive account of how the work of judging 
proceeds from day to day. Instead, we are given a fairly abstract 
vision of judging, divorced from the realities of dockets, 
caseloads, and so on. We are given judges, functioning in a more 
or less monastic way,7' but no information about who appoints 
them and why, or about the machinery that surrounds them-
especially their law clerks, who, as Posner observes, may actually 
be charged with the burden of doing all the reasoning that 
Powell loads onto the judges' own shoulders alone. We are given 
a discussion of judges' motivations that rests on a set of 
archetypical characters (Powell 16-27), but no sense of the 
welter of "inglorious determinants" that actually drive judges. 
from the political to the personal to the institutional. We are told 
to assume that "meaningful conversation" can take place among 
judges (Powell 85), but we are told very little about whether it 
does take place and whether it changes anyone's minds. In place 
of a non-ideal reality-although it is difficult to charge this 
reality with being non-ideal unless we have a realistic sense of 
what is actually possible- we are given an ideal fantasy.'" 
75. See Powell 49 (describing. with a mixture of criticism and wistfulness. Felix 
Frankfurter's description of judges as being under an obligation to live and work 
monastically). 
76. Cf Powell 121 (acknowledging that the virtues he describes ··can be accused of 
fantasy. a failure to see that the political enjoys priority in a much harsher sense than I 
have conceded. that there is not and cannot be anything other than the agonistic struggle 
of political preferences""). 
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Of course, one might respond that this is the very point of 
Powell's book: to give us an ideal sense of what judges should 
aspire to. But no aspirational guide can be of much use unless it 
is at least somewhat tied to the real forces that move and affect 
judges.77 Untethered to a more well-grounded account of what 
judging involves, Powell's account threatens to simply float 
away. 
Powell is aware of the dangers of too "ought"-focused an 
account of constitutional virtue. He writes that "[a] line of moral 
thought unable to shape decisively the moral practices to which 
it is directed is of dubious value to anyone" (Powell 50). It is for 
this reason that he supplies the list of constitutional virtues that 
make up the latter part of his book. But I wonder whether he has 
escaped the danger of vacuity that he warns of, for two reasons. 
First, it is questionable that one can speak confidently of being 
able to "shape decisively" the moral practices of judges unless 
one has a far more accurate and realistic understanding of what 
judges can actually achieve, given their limitations and 
motivations and the institutional forces that surround them. To 
do so is like describing the ideal swimmer without asking 
whether the actual swimmer is chained to an anchor. 
Second-and, as we shall see, this is a common attack on 
any virtue-centered account of ethical practice- the actual 
virtues Powell ascribes to the ideal judge are arguably too thin to 
be called decisive. Even if we assume away all the real-world 
influences on judges and rely only on Powell's moral account, 
that account supplies very little by way of actual guidance. 
Where Powell's account is thicker, it is also more 
questionable. Like many theorists who want to make the fraught 
move from a general sensibility to a more specific set of 
substantive implications, Powell offers up a set of "substantive 
commitments [that] correlate with the constitutional virtues" 
(Powell 110). But those commitments are both too abstract and 
too specific to be convincing or useful. At the abstract level, 
injunctions about the "absence of orthodoxy" or the "priority of 
the political'' are not terribly helpful decision guides (Powell 
110-11). If, on the other hand, we treat these commitments in a 
thicker fashion, we may wonder how they are related to Powell's 
77. Cf Julia Annas. Virtue Ethics. in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL 
THEORY S15 (David Copp ed .. 2006) ('"[A]n ethical theory is weakened if the best 
contemporary science conflicts with its claims or makes it hard to see how they could be 
true.""). 
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broader virtue-centered account. Do virtues such as integrity 
and candor really tell us anything about whether government 
can prescribe orthodoxy. or about whether "[t]he community of 
those who count" under the Constitution includes gays and 
lesbians for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment? (Powell 
113). Or are those substantive commitments another thing 
entirely. with little relation to any account of judging that centers 
on the judicial agent and his or her virtues? 
I must emphasize that I find much of Powell's idealized 
account of constitutional virtue compelling, particularly his view 
that judging contains an irreducible component of moral choice 
and obligation. But his book demonstrates the dangers of 
focusing too heavily on the judicial "'ought" without adequate 
consideration of the judicial "is ... Powell may content himself by 
asserting that he has nothing to say to those readers who 
question whether his idealized account is too far-flung from lived 
reality, and that any other approach would render 
constitutionalism "a fraud" (Powell 100). But that move 
excludes most sensible readers. in my view. and certainly anyone 
who has been at all persuaded by the voluminous literature on 
judging that I only touched on in Part I. Those who live in the 
world of the judicial "is" may be moved by Powell's eloquence, 
but that is not the same thing as being persuaded by it. 
Farber and Sherry's Judgment Calls falls next on the 
spectrum from judicial "ought" to ''is." It is neither as idealistic 
as Powell's book nor as realistic as Posner's. Despite my 
sympathies with its effort to split the difference between Posner 
and Powell, however, I will argue here that its attempt is still 
unconvincing. largely because it is resides too much in the world 
of "ought" and not enough in the world of "is." 
To be sure, Judgment Calls is far more aware of the actual 
practices of judging. Although I have already suggested that its 
use of the psychological and other literature on judging is thin, 
certainly it is far more active in its use of these sources than 
Powell's book is. although that is a low standard and Powell's 
approach is less dependent on those kinds of arguments. Farber 
and Sherry are explicit in acknowledging that "[j]udges do not 
operate in a vacuum" (Farber & Sherry 4). and they offer a tally 
of internal and external factors that may influence judges in their 
work. 
By straddling the line between a descriptive and a 
normative account of judges. however. Farber and Sherry fail to 
satisfy the demands of either approach. This is especially 
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apparent in their defense of judicial review. Farber and Sherry 
write that the judiciary is "a human institution, and so we ask 
only whether the judiciary can do its job well enough to make 
the enterprise worthwhile" (Farber & Sherry x). More clearly 
stilL they write that critics of judicial review fall short because 
they "fail to compare judicial review in a realistic way with its 
alternatives. We cannot ask whether judicial review is desirable 
without asking 'compared to what?'" (Farber & Sherry 13). But 
they do not undertake a full-fledged comparative institutional 
analysis. one that views each of the competing institutions in a 
non-ideal fashion and balances the costs and benefits of giving 
the primary interpretive role to any one of them. Adrian 
Vermeule. by contrast, has undertaken just this sort of analysis, 
and has argued that the judiciary may not be the institution best 
suited to this task.7s One need not agree with Vermeule 's 
conclusions to conclude that a more vigorous defense of judicial 
review is required, especially if that defense is going to be 
situated in comparative institutional terms. 
Given how firmly entrenched judicial review is in the 
constitutional game as it is played today, Farber and Sherry's 
book would be no weaker if they had bypassed this issue 
altogether. So let us assume that the legitimacy of judicial review 
is not at issue. The question, then, is whether Farber and 
Sherry's account of constitutional judging, both in descriptive 
and in normative terms. achieves its aims. They write that 
judicial decisions can be evaluated on the basis of 
"reasonableness." a catch-all phrase that takes into account 
whether a decision acknowledges competing arguments, whether 
it "articulate[ s] plausible distinctions and intelligible standards," 
and so on (Farber & Sherry 4). They add: "This may seem like 
an uncontroversial thesis-and it should be-but in fact we have 
received remarkably sharp rejoinders from skeptics" (Farber & 
Sherry 4). 
Small wonder. Of course, Farber and Sherry's very point is 
that constitutional decision-making involves judgment calls. But 
putting "judgment" in such capacious terms as "the strength of 
... legal reasoning" (Farber & Sherry 4) approaches circularity. 
Constitutional judgments are legitimate if they are reasonable, if 
they involve "the rule of law" rather than "lawless fiat" (Farber 
7R See. e.g .. ADRIAI'i VERMEULE. JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN 
1:'-iSTITUTIO:\AL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006): ADRIAN VERMEULE. 
LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASOI'i (2008). 
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& Sherry 4). and we can tell if they are reasonable because they 
display good judgment. It is not completely circular-they 
certainly do not believe that any set of reasons falls within the 
scope of "reasonable'' constitutional practice- but it is so 
general as to be unhelpful. It does little to exclude any but the 
most obvious departures from standard judicial practice. It does 
not blunt Posner's charge that the Supreme Court swims in an 
ocean of discretion; it merely suggests that this discretion is 
lightly bounded by a set of acceptable rhetorical moves and 
practices, a point that Posner would hardly contest. 
Farber and Sherry think reasonableness does more than 
this. They think it provides a serious constraining force on 
judges, who may find that an opinion "just won't write" (Farber 
& Sherry 44). More generally. they argue that judges don't 
perceive themselves as exercising boundless discretion: "they 
may feel that they are not reaching 'outside the law' for a 
policy solution, but 'inside the law' for concepts and values" 
(Farber & Sherry 39). There are three problems with this 
response. First, it neglects the institutional world in which 
judges operate, and particularly the ability of both judges and, 
importantly, their law clerks to translate the vaguest intuitions 
or policy sentiments into the language of judging.n That is why 
Posner argues that judges might be more constrained if they 
acknowledged the extent of their discretion. and drew in a 
more explicit way on pragmatic considerations that ostensibly 
lie "outside the law," rather than taking too seriously their own 
urge to believe that they are acting "within the law." (Posner 
252). Second, notwithstanding their occasional efforts to draw 
on psychological research, Farber and Sherry here neglect the 
point that judges may not be aware of the cognitive influences 
that press them toward what they see as a "reasonable" 
decision in spite of equally reasonable counter-arguments."' 
Finally, even if reasonableness, as they describe it. acts as 
something of a constraining force, it does not constrain very 
much: it is a muu-muu, not a corset. At this level of generality, 
79. See. e.g.. Oldfather. supra note 26. at 144 ("[G]iven the number of cases on [the 
judge's] docket and the amount and nature of assistance provided by his law clerks. it 
may not even be that we can meaningfully count on him to ·decide' some of the cases 
before him at all."): Mark Tushnet. Constitutional Interpretation. Character. and 
Experience. 72 B.U. L. REV. 747. 752 (1992) (making the now widely understood point 
that "[b]ecause most opinions are now drafted by law clerks. the opinions may not 
represent the work of the Justice making the decision"). 
80. See. e.g.. Simon. supra note 51. at 1112. 
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the line between the "rule of law" and "lawless fiat" is hard to 
percetve. 
The loose nature of the constraints offered by Farber and 
Sherry is evident in their discussion. We have already dealt with 
the requirement of reasoned elaboration and the view that some 
opinions "won't write." To take another instance. Farber and 
Sherry. like PowelL write of the constraining force of 
deliberation on collegial courts. But Posner, among others, has 
questioned the role that collegial deliberation actually plays in 
judicial decision-making. They write that "[t]here is some 
evidence that deliberation among judges, especially on the 
Supreme Court. is decreasing," and chalk some of this up to the 
different forms that deliberation may take in an electronic age 
(Farber & Sherry 92). It would be better. perhaps. to question 
whether collegial deliberation has ever played that significant a 
role."1 
Farber and Sherry also argue that transparency is another 
important constraining factor on judges (Farber & Sherry 97-
104) But this discussion seems to conflate transparency with 
candor."2 Whether judicial candor is really a necessary aspect of 
judicial decision-making is a debatable point.'" At present. 
suffice it to say that it is unclear that judges need be candid 
about what they are doing, provided that they are transparent 
about providing some set of reasons for their actions. As 
Tushnet observes, because opinions are ·'a form of persuasive 
writing" directed at an audience, "[w]hat moves the audience 
need not be what moves the author. ,>4 Certainly. 
notwithstanding their appeal to "the way judges themselves 
perceive their work" (Farber & Sherry 39), it is not clear that 
81. We might also note Clark and Trubek's observation. in criticizing Karl 
Llewellyn for arguing that deliberation. among other .. checks and controls ... can .. wash 
out individual bias ... that Llewellyn's examples of great judges are. paradoxically ... just 
those men who could and did influence a whole court to follow their views ... Clark & 
Trubek. supra note 7. at 263. The same could be said of some of the Justices who serve as 
exemplars for Farber and Sherry. 
1-12. See. e.g.. Farber & Sherry 98: 
Transparency is both an independent value and a necessary concomitant of the 
other constraints we discuss in this book. If a judge is not candid about what she 
is doing and why. then it is impossible to know whether she is being faithful to 
precedent or to the principles of incrementalism. 
83. See. e.g.. Scott Altman. Beyond Candor. 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990): Scott C. 
Idleman. A Prudemial Theory of Judicial Candor. 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1995): David L. 
Shapiro. In Defense of Judicial Candor. 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987): Martin Shapiro. 
Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y !55 (1994): Micah Schwartzman. Judicial 
Sinceritr. 94 VA. L. REV. 9R7 (200R). 
R4 .. Tushnt.!l. ~upra note 79. at 752-53. 
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judges are actually candid to themselves about what they are 
doing. We might wish for them to be- a point that tends to favor 
Posner's arguments in favor of an open appeal to pragmatic 
considerations rather than conventional rule-of-law values- but 
that does not make the wish any less quixotic. 
The looseness of the constraints Farber and Sherry offer is 
finally evident in their case studies of particular fields of 
constitutional law. It should be unsurprising that differences of 
opinion arise when we get to particulars, and one should not 
hold this fact against them too much. But the fact that the 
conclusions reached by Farber and Sherry in each of the realms 
they evaluate-cases involving terrorism, abortion, and 
affirmative action-are either tendentious or. to use their 
critics' phrase, "wishy-washy" (Farber & Sherry 168), tends to 
suggest the difficulty of moving from general principles such as 
"exercise good judgment'' or "provide reasoned explanations" 
(Farber & Sherry 167) to actual constraints on constitutional 
judgment itself. For example, Farber and Sherry attempt to 
distinguish the Court's abortion jurisprudence from the 
Lochnerx' line of cases by arguing that the Lochner-era Court 
"conspicuously failed to connect its view of 'freedom of 
contract' with constitutional traditions," and that its subsequent 
decisions attempting to justify the original decision were "fitful 
and hard to reconcile," whereas the Court in its abortion 
jurisprudence ''has tried to accommodate opposing values 
when it became clear that its ruling was deeply opposed" 
(Farber & Sherry 50-51). Even if we accept that these sorts of 
responses to public opinion represent acceptable judgment calls 
rather than "lawless fiat." however, it would take a more 
discerning eye than mine to show that the Lochner Court was 
more untethered to constitutional tradition than the Roe or 
Casey Courts. or that the post-Roe decisions of the Court have 
been any less "fitful and hard to reconcile." Similar criticisms 
could be made about the conclusions that Farber and Sherry 
draw in each of their case studies. What this suggests is not that 
the Court has or has not exercised good judgment in any of 
these areas, but that the issues themselves rest on such 
contested policy and ideological grounds that "reasonableness" 
cannot point the way to one conclusion or another-that they 
are "political" issues, in Posner's sense of the term. But that 
suggests either that any decision in these kinds of areas, and in 
R5. Lochner v. New York. 19X U.S. 45 (1905). 
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constitutional law more generally. will be closer to ''lawless 
fiat" than "rule of law," or that any judgment, suitably dressed 
up in constitutional language, might be said to be reasonable-
in which case "judgment calls" will be of very little help. 
My point is not to lambaste a fine work for what it does not 
accomplish rather than for what it does. It is that the flaws in this 
work are intimately connected to an uneasy tension between the 
judicial "is" and ''ought." Farber and Sherry want to argue that 
there is no tension there: the virtues that they see as crucial to 
the constitutional enterprise. that make "judgment calls" 
legitimate and worthwhile, are immanent in the actual activity of 
judging and offer meaningful restraints on that activity. As an 
"is." however. this argument is too thin to be wholly convincing. 
And as an "ought," it is only valuable if it is suitable to judges in 
the real world and actually likely to constrain them. Judgment 
Calls may fail to satisfy on either side of the line. 
Indeed. in some respects, the effort to straddle the line 
between is and ought in Judgment Calls makes it a book at war 
with itself. This is especially clear in the tension between Farber 
and Sherry's praise on the one hand for candor and 
transparency, their disdain for those who believe that ''the 
public ... cannot be trusted with various kinds of knowledge" 
(Farber & Sherry 102). and their argument on the other hand 
that critics of the Court should not attribute its decisions ''to 
political motives," because "it incrementally persuades the 
public or the judges themselves that the law is about politics and 
therefore that we should expect judges to be blatantly political." 
(Farber & Sherry 96). It is hard to see how the public, in Edenic 
fashion. can be trusted with "various kinds of knowledge." 
except for the crucial knowledge that some of the Court's most 
thoughtful critics think its constitutional decisions are, at bottom. 
political.'" In any event. Farber and Sherry then immediately 
violate their own injunction by saying-and not without 
reason- that Bush v. Gorl7 "betrayed all of the principles 
discussed so far" (Farber & Sherry 110). They may be right. 
although it is quite possible to construct a lawyerly defense of 
even that decision.t>H But the tension in their views is a result of 
86. See CARDOZO. supra note 7. at 167 ("There has been a certain lack of candor in 
the discussion of the theme [of the non-legal influences on judges]. or rather perhaps in 
the refusal to discuss it. as if judges must lose respect and confidence by the reminder 
that they are subject to human limitations."). 
f/.7. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
88. See. e.g .. Jonathan L. Entin. Equal Prorecrion. rhe Conscienrious Judge, and rhe 
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the difficulty that Judgment Calls faces in trying to achieve both 
a descriptive and a normative goal. I tend to think that the book 
is ultimately best viewed as an "ought" book rather than an "is" 
book, but it is not clear that it succeeds on either front. 
Of the three books under review, How Judges Think is 
most clearly an "is" book. Not for Posner are any rhapsodies to 
the moral seriousness of judging or to the triumph of the rule of 
law over lawless fiat. He will have no truck with "Law Day 
rhetoric" (Posner 1) or "professional mystification" (Posner 3). 
This is squarely a book about the "actual practices" of judges. 
not their ideal practices (Posner 2). And this is a book that 
draws not on moral theories, or somewhat vain hopes about the 
constraining features of general principles such as candor or 
humility, or warnings about the corruption of the 
"constitutional enterprise." Instead, it draws heavily and richly 
on empirical studies and social science literature. with a 
completeness that would neither be possible in a book the size 
of Judgment Calls nor. ultimately, especially complementary to 
that book's underlying "ought"-centered motivations. With 
barely restrained glee, Posner warns readers to "brace 
themselves" for the use of tools and terms like "reversal 
aversion," "Bayes's theorem," ''monopsony," ·'authoritarian 
personality," and "agency costs.'' (Posner 11). Unlike Farber 
and Sherry, who warn about studies of judging that depart from 
judges' own purported mental image of their own work, Posner 
is unapologetic about "discussing judicial thinking in a 
vocabulary alien to most judges and lawyers. Judicial behavior 
cannot be understood in the vocabulary that judges themselves 
use, sometimes mischievously" (Posner 11 ). Although, as its 
title suggests, How Judges Think takes an internal as well as an 
external view of judging as an activity, it is a decidedly different 
internal view than the one that is sometimes touched on by 
Farber and Sherry, one that focuses on what judges actually 
think at a subconscious level. why they think the way they do 
and what motivations lead to these thoughts. rather than on 
judges' surface level self-perceptions. Even Posner's spirited 
defense of constrained judicial pragmatism, which might seem 
2006 Presidential Election. 61 Mo. L. REV. 576 (2002) (arguing that there are reasonable. 
but contestable. defenses of the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore): Richard L. Epstein. 
"In such Manner as the Legislalllre Thereof May Direct": The Olllcome in Bush v. Gore 
Defended. 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 613 (2001) (defending the outcome on other legal 
grounds): Nelson Lund. The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore. 23 CARDOZO L. 
REV.l219 (2002) (defending the decision). 
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to take on a more idealized view of how judges should behave, 
begins at base with the argument that judges are already 
actually constrained pragmatists. 
As an "is" book, I find Posner's book largely compelling 
and persuasive. As against Farber and Sherry, who attempt to 
split the difference between idealized and actual judging 
practices, it is a far more thorough and successful effort. As to 
Powell's Constitutional Conscience, one should not so much 
compare the two books as contrast them. They are close to 
mirror opposites, and one may find each persuasive in its own 
way-one as a description of what judges actually do and the 
other as an account of what judges must do to make 
constitutional judging a morally serious enterprise. For all that, 
despite the deep emotional appeal of Powell's book, it is difficult 
to escape the sense that Posner's book is more convincing; that, 
like a cockroach after a nuclear holocaust, it will survive, ugly 
perhaps but adaptive and nimble, long after its rival. 
An ''is" argument cannot wholly vanquish an "ought" 
sentiment however, although it can certainly inform and should 
probably chasten those sentiments. So it seems to me that How 
Judges Think cannot wholly undermine those who would like to 
think about how judges ought to think, although it demonstrates 
that any idealized account of the latter cannot persuade too 
deeply if it is insufficiently attentive to the former. For one thing, 
in some sense the two projects are simply different: they can 
influence but not overcome each other. More deeply, however. 
and despite what Powell writes (Powell 4, 9), I do not read 
Posner as denying Powell's fundamental point that judging 
contains an irreducible moral component. Although that is the 
evident spirit of Powell's judgment of Posner's approach, what 
he actually says about Posner is closer to the truth: that Posner 
denies that a judge has a "moral or even political duty to abide 
by constitutional text'' (Powell4) (emphasis added). 
That may be right, although Posner would surely argue that 
constitutional text is among the principal matters that judges in 
constitutional cases must reckon with, if only for pragmatic 
reasons. But as Powell's own account surely acknowledges. 
constitutional text is only one part of the activity of 
constitutional judging, leaving aside the matter of statutory or 
common-law judging. It involves a rich variety of legal- and, I 
would say along with Posner, extralegal-considerations besides 
the text itself. In that wider realm. Posner, like both Powell and 
Farber and Sherry, does not believe that any comprehensive 
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theory or mechanism of judging can be reduced to an algorithm. 
Although the kinds of considerations that Posner believes may 
enter into the work of judges as occasional legislators center 
around pragmatic considerations, those considerations do not 
exclude, but rather necessarily must include, moral 
considerations, although they might not be recognizable to 
Powell as the kinds of moral considerations he thinks ought to 
hold sway in the constitutional realm. To the extent that Posner 
is arguing that judges cannot be fully constrained in their work 
by any mechanical forces, he is perforce agreeing that judging 
includes a moral component. That should be clear from his 
invocation of Sartre's concept of bad faith, which he describes as 
"the denial of freedom to choose, and so the shirking of personal 
responsibility" (Posner 104). Posner's judge, too, cannot escape 
the weight of moral choice, although Posner may think that a 
suitably "moral" approach to judging should be more 
instrumentalist than abstract. 
In short, although Posner does a splendid job of describing 
the actual and inglorious determinants of lived judicial reality, he 
does not exclude the possibility of thinking about the judicial 
role and judicial character in a more normative fashion. More 
than that, to the extent that his denial of any absolutely 
constraining theories of judicial interpretation is correct and the 
judge is thrown back on her own judgment. however defined, 
Posner's description of the judicial "is" provides very fertile 
space for thinking anew, but now in a suitably informed fashion, 
about the normative ideals judges should strive for. By focusing 
so relentlessly on the "is," Posner may, somewhat paradoxically, 
lay stronger foundations for thinking about the judicial "ought" 
than either Powell or Farber and Sherry. 
Furthermore, Posner provides some useful spaces in which a 
normative theory of judging, but one that is grounded on a more 
practical sense of what is possible for judges, might develop. 
Recall that one of the "tastes" that Posner argues judges have 
for the job, and that leads them to choose the judicial office over 
more lucrative options, is "a taste for being a good judge" 
(Posner 60). This taste Posner describes as being both "intrinsic" 
and "validated and reinforced by a judge's reputation in the 
judicial and the broader legal community, and sometimes in 
other communities as well" (Posner 60). Thus, a judge with 
average tastes wants "[t]o regard [himself] and be regarded by 
others, especially [his] peers, as a good judge." (Posner 61 ). That 
means, among other things, following the rules of the judicial 
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game, as set out in the judicial oath and elsewhere (Posner 70). 
Judges do not want to be thought of as ""politicians in robes," 
since that would deprive them of both the intrinsic satisfaction of 
the job and the benefits of being regarded by others as a good 
judge (Posner 61). Moreover. according to Posner. since judging 
and its satisfactions are intimately connected to the exercise of 
power, the good judge may be motivated by a sense of 
responsibility and conscience (Posner 62). 
This is, to be sure, close to Farber and Sherry's concern 
with judicial self-perception. and in some ways to Powell's 
more virtue-oriented account of judging. But it is a more 
persuasive account. Unlike Farber and Sherry. Posner does not 
treat judicial self-perception as accurate: unlike Powell, he 
treats the judicial taste for being, and being regarded as, a good 
judge as one among many psychological motivations rather 
than as a moral demand, and he thus does not raise the stakes 
of the judicial game to the breaking point. But Posner does 
suggest that among the motivations that may drive judges, an 
important one is the desire to be and be thought of as a "good" 
judge, with all the demands on conscience that may make: and 
he suggests that this desire may be shaped by the conventional 
norms and expectations that surround judging. including the 
norms derived from the judicial oath. In so doing. Posner gives 
us room to think again about what judicial character is, what it 
might demand, and how, in something other than the best of all 
possible worlds, we might shape and constrain judicial 
character in positive ways. 
IV. JUDICIAL CHARACTER, JUDICIAL VIRTUE, AND 
THE OATH: A (SOMEWHAT) ARETAIC PERSPECTIVE 
We are left, then, with the following questions. How can we 
adopt a vision of judging that is more realistic, more willing to 
take into account the "inglorious determinants" of judicial 
behavior rather than simply rejecting them, than Powell's vision? 
What sort of normative vision can we use to fill in the gaps left 
by Posner's largely descriptive account, without ignoring the 
psychological and institutional influences on judging that he 
brings to life? Can we, finally, thread the path between the 
judicial "is" and the judicial "ought" in a way that builds on but 
is richer and more convincing than the attempt offered by Farber 
and Sherry? In some measure, I think we can. 
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We might see our way clear to such a vision by beginning 
with some important common ground among all three books. 
We might begin by insisting, with Powell, on the irreducible and 
ineluctable "presence of a moral dimension to the role of the 
judge" (Powell 41),~9 and with Posner on the ineliminable role of 
a sense of personal responsibility and conscience in the typical 
judge's motivations (Posner 62). 
Similarly, and on this all three books are clearly in 
agreement, we might accept the premise-a fighting premise, to 
some, but one that will find many adherents in the legal academy 
and even more in the judiciary- that no purportedly 
comprehensive theory of constitutional (or legal) interpretation 
can so perfectly constrain the judge as to render the gravity of 
the moral choices entailed in judging inconsequential. Whatever 
its theoretical merits, a formalist or originalist approach to 
judging certainly cannot, in practice, eliminate the need for 
practical judgment in particular decisions, nor can it eliminate 
the specter of Sartrean bad faith that Posner describes.<)() In this 
sense, Justice Scalia's phrase "faint-hearted originalist"91 is not 
an epithet but a saving grace.92 Neither legalism, in the more 
general sense of doctrinalism, nor pragmatism deny the moral 
component to judging-a point that incidentally suggests that 
the distinction urged by Powell between instrumentalist and 
non-instrumentalist approaches to judging is not always as 
important as it may seem. Whether a judge's discretion is 
somewhat constrained or utterly unbounded, discretion there 
must be. There will always be open spaces in judging. With them 
come the obligation of moral choice and the need for practical 
wisdom. 
These premises redeem the promise I made early in this 
Essay to show that judicial character matters. For, where 
discretion cannot be eliminated and there is no perfect set of 
decision rules for the person charged with the obligation to make 
89. See also R. George Wright. Dependence and Hierarchy Among Constitutional 
Theories. 70 BROOK. L. REV. 141. 196 (2004) ("To decide a constitutional question is 
inescapably a moral activity."). 
90. This is true even if one adopts formalism for instrumental reasons. See Solum. 
supra note 11. at 530 (arguing that even the institutionally grounded argument for 
formalist judging made by Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule. see Cass R. Sunstein & 
Adrian Vermeule. Interpretation and Institutions. 101 MICH. L. REv. 885 (2003 ). 
"requires the aretaic turn"). 
91. Antonin Scalia. Originalism: The Lesser Evil. 57 U. CiN. L. REV. 849. 862. 864 
(1989). 
92. But see Randy E. Barnett. Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted" 
Originalism. 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006). 
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judgments, we are perforce thrown back to the question of 
character. That is so not because a focus on character will 
necessarily provide a perfectly clear description of judicial 
behavior, let alone a decision guide for judges in particular cases 
that allows us to assess definitively the rightness or wrongness of 
particular decisions. It is because, for all the difficult questions it 
may leave to be addressed, character simply is an ineluctable 
part of the judicial role.93 Because it cannot be avoided, it must 
not be neglected. 
Once we agree that character is an unavoidable part of the 
judicial role and worthy of study in its own right and for its own 
sake, we have taken what Larry Solum calls an "aretaic turn. ,<J.l 
That is, we have moved away from "a myopic focus on either 
moral rules or the calculation of consequences to a broader 
vision of normativity that focuses on human excellence. "95 The 
aretaic turn in law is similar to the aretaic turn in contemporary 
moral and ethical philosophy. In philosophy, the aretaic turn is 
both a positive and a negative project. Negatively. what it entails 
is a rejection of the two approaches to moral philosophy that 
reigned more or less alone before virtue ethics entered the 
scene: utilitarianism, with its focus on consequences, and 
deontology, represented most strongly by Kant, with its focus on 
rights and duties. Positively, virtue ethicists not only finds 
significant problems with these approaches as a guide to ethical 
conduct,96 but suggests a new approach to ethical theory, one 
that is distinctly agent-centered and focused on questions of 
character. Although Solum notes that legal theory for a long 
time neglected the emergence of virtue ethics as a competitor to 
utilitarian or deontological approaches to moral philosophy, the 
tide has plainly shifted, and an increasing number of articles 
applying virtue ethics across a range of legal problems suggest 
that "[l]egal theory has begun, at least tentatively, to make the 
aretaic turn.''<n 
If the time lag between the flourishing of virtue ethics in 
philosophy and its emergence in legal theory is unsurprising-
93. For observations along these lines. see. Tushnet. supra note 79 (arguing that 
because constitutional theory cannot serve as a strong constraint on judges. we must look 
to judges' character): see also id. at 763 ('"Analyzing character now makes more sense to 
me than paying attention to theory.") 
94. See Solum. supra note 11. 
95. /d. at 495. 
96. See,e.g .. G.E.M. Anscombe. Modern Moral Philosophy. 33 PHILOSOPHY 1 
(1958). 
97. Solum. supra note 11. at 495. 
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legal scholarship is, after all, generally parasitic on the 
developments of the prior generation of work in other 
disciplines-neither should its eventual attraction to legal theory 
be surprising. Just as, in philosophy, utilitarianism and 
deontology were generally seen as being attractive because they 
offered a sure-footed and detailed guide to proper action, a 
claim that arguably has been undermined by the virtue ethicists, 
so legal theory, and constitutional theory in particular, have 
sought to find clear decision guides for judges-whether 
methodological, as in formalism or originalism, or more abstract, 
as in rights-based theories of judging and other recourses to 
"principle" in judicial conduct, of which Dworkin is perhaps the 
modern exemplar. But the one thing that the authors under 
review agree on, and in this they are joined by many in legal and 
constitutional theory, is that there is no "single 'decision 
procedure for judging' -some rule that would guarantee the 
correct outcome in every single case.""" The aretaic turn in 
jurisprudence is thus similar in important respects to the aretaic 
turn in moral philosophy. It involves both a negative project and 
a positive project. Negatively, it rejects the view that some single 
method, whether focused on outcomes or on abstract duties, can 
provide a decision procedure for judging. Positively, it argues 
that the failure of these competing approaches is best responded 
to by focusing instead on the character of the agents charged 
with making judicial decisions and attempting to evaluate the 
judicial role by asking in the first place what constitutes a 
"virtuous judge. ,w If we view the central questions of legal 
theory in this agent-centered way, we can see that the ultimate 
focus of each of the books under review is ultimately one of 
judicial character, however divergent the approaches of those 
books may seem at first. 
Although this Essay is too short a space for a full 
description of even virtue jurisprudence, 101 let alone virtue ethics, 
a few words about each are obviously appropriate. Begin with 
virtue ethics. 101 Although there are many potential versions of 
9R !d. at 49H. 
99. !d. 
100. For their best explication. see the sources cited in note 11. KRONMAN. supra 
note 8. offers a description of the ··lawyer-statesman·· ideal that owes much to virtue 
ethics as well. 
101. Among the sources on which I rely are ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE. ON VIRTUE 
ETHICS (1999): ALISDAIR MAChTYRE. AFTER VIRTUE (3d ed. 2007): VIRTUE ETHICS 
(Roger Crisp & Michael Slate eds .. !997): VIRTUE ETHICS: A CRITICAL READER 
(Daniel Statman ed .. 1997): VIRTLE: NOMOS XXXIV (John W. Chapman & William A. 
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virtue ethics, and not all of them are necessarily Aristotelian,102 
modern virtue ethics has often drawn heavily on Aristotle's 
Nichomachean Ethics. As we have already seen, it draws on 
Aristotelian ethics (and is often called "neo-Aristotelian" in 
approach) in large measure to seek a way out of what it sees as 
the flaws of the prevailing approaches to moral philosophy: 
utilitarianism and deontology. In contrast to those approaches, it 
argues that "the basic judgments in ethics" are not about either 
consequences or duties, but "judgments about character. " 103 In 
other words, rather than moving from a consideration of right or 
wrong actions to a consideration of what constitutes virtue, 
virtue ethics treats "the concept of virtue [as] explanatory prior 
to that of right conduct."l()4 Virtue ethics claims, most centrally, 
that "[a] right action is one that is in accordance with what a 
virtuous person would do in the circumstances, and what makes 
the action right is that it is what a person with a virtuous 
character would do here. " 105 
Central to this (very basic) account of virtue ethics are two 
underlying principles. The first is the Aristotelian concept of 
eudaimonia, which has been variously translated as "happiness," 
''flourishing," or "well-being."100 The ethical project thus begins 
teleologically, by treating human flourishing as the highest aim 
toward which we can aspire and asking how we might achieve it. 
The answer lies in the virtues. As Macintyre puts it, "The 
virtues are precisely those qualities the possession of which will 
enable an individual to achieve eudaimonia and the lack of 
which will frustrate his movement toward that telos." 107 A life of 
eudaimonia is simply "a life of activity in accord with the human 
excellences (or virtues)." 10H The virtues are thus viewed as those 
qualities that are "necessary conditions for, or ... constitutive 
elements of, human flourishing and wellbeing." 109 As one can 
Galston eds .. 1992): Annas. supra note 77. 
102. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 101. at 9-10. 
103. Daniel Statman. Introduction to Virtue Ethics. in VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 
101. at 1. 7 (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter Statman. Introduction]. 
104. /d.: see also Gary Watson. On the Primacy of Character. in VIRTUE ETHICS. 
supra note 101. at 56. 
105. Justin Oakley & Dean Cocking. Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles 9 (2001) 
(emphasis in original). In offering this description of virtue ethics, Oakley and Cocking 
are drawing on the work of Rosalind Hursthouse and Philippa Foot. although most virtue 
ethicists would agree with this basic premise. 
106. See, e.g .. HURSTHOUSE. supra note 101. at 9. 
107. MACINTYRE. supra note 101. at 148. 
108. Solum. supra note 11. at 497. 
109. Statman. Introduction. supra note 103. at 8. 
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imagine, what constitutes the list of virtues is a debatable point, 
but it is certainly taken to include what we would commonly and 
intuitively think of as belonging on such a list: qualities like 
"courage, temperance, good temper, and justice." 1111 They are the 
virtues without which eudaimonia is unattainable. 111 
The virtues are both "character traits'' and, more deeply, 
"excellences of character. " 112 They involve not merely a 
disposition to act in particular ways, but without particularly 
virtuous reasons for doing so,m but actually acting virtuously and 
for virtuous reasons. 11 ~ Central to the ability to act soundly in 
accordance with the virtues is a particular virtue, that of 
phronesis, or practical wisdom: "the ability to reason correctly 
about practical matters. " 11 ' Although Aristotle exalts sophia, or 
theoretical wisdom, for its concern with the "highest" thin~s, 11 " 
for the virtuous actor, phronesis is ''the overarching virtue." 17 It 
is what "guid[es] us to what should be done in [givenJ situations, 
and thus "always ensures right action and response. " 1 x Phronesis 
is thus central to any account of the virtuous actor in the world, 
such as a judge. 
Even on this abbreviated account, we can see certain central 
traits that might be said to characterize a virtue ethics approach. 
It rejects the competing approaches to ethics characterized by 
utilitarianism and deontology; indeed, it argues that these 
"principled" approaches have failed to help us with practical 
ethical problems. 11 y Accordingly, it moves away from attempts to 
find a clear set of "right" and "wrong" answers to ethical 
problems and move from those to questions of character, and 
instead treats the question of character as having primacy in 
ethics. It focuses in particular on what constitutes virtuous 
conduct in any given situation, by which it means that right 
110. Solum. supra note II. at 497. 
Ill. See. e.g .. Oakley & Cocking. supra note 105. at 15. 
112. HURSTHOUSE. supra note 101. at 12. 
113. See id. at 11. 
11-t. See. e.g .. Robert B. Louden. On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics. in VIRTL:E 
ETHICS. supra note 101. at 180. 182. · 
115. HliRSTHOL'SE. supra note 101. at 12. 
116. See. e.g.. Edmund D. Pellegrino. Professing Medicine, Virllle Based Ethics. and 
the Retrieval of Professionalism. in WORKISG VIRTL:E (Rebecca L. Walker & Philip J. 
Ivanhoe eds .. 2007) at 61. 77. 
117. Jennifer Radden. Virrue Ethics as Professional Ethics: The Case of Psrchiatrv. in 
WORKIC\IG VIRTL'E. supra note 116. at 113. 129: . . -
118. /d. 
119. See. e.g .. Ht.:RSTHOL'SE. supra note 101. at 40: Statman. Introduction. supra note 
103. at 6: Watson. supra note 104. at 60. 
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conduct is simply what any virtuous actor. blessed among other 
things by a strong sense of practical wisdom, would do in the 
circumstances. Although it may be objected that there is a note 
of circularity in the virtue ethical approach, Hursthouse argues 
that this is not true: virtue ethics "specifies [the virtuous agent] 
in terms of the virtues, and then specifies these, not merely as 
dispositions to right action. but as the character traits (which are 
dispositions to feel and react as well as act in certain ways) 
required for eudaimonia. ,ICI, 
Virtue jurisprudence builds on virtue ethics in the realm of 
legal theory. It is, Solum writes, "simply the translation of the 
aretaic turn in moral theory to the context of lawmaking and 
adjudication. " 1c1 Of particular relevance for our purposes, the 
aretaic turn in jurisprudence does not begin with an ideal theory 
of judicial interpretation, including an ideal theory of 
constitutional interpretation, and then ask what judicial virtues 
might ensure the achievement of that interpretive approach; 
indeed, as we have seen, it begins by assuming that there is no 
"single 'decision procedure for judging. ,,~:•c Instead, it takes 
questions of judicial character, or virtue, as prior and primary. 
"In response to the question of ideal theory-'How in principle 
should judges decide the constitutional controversies that are 
presented to them?' -a virtue-centered theory of judging gives 
an aretaic answer-judges should decide constitutional cases in 
accord with the judicial virtues. " 1'' It is "virtue-centered," not 
"decision-centered.'' 12~ 
Like virtue ethics, virtue jurisprudence generates a list of 
virtues from the telos of judging, asking "what makes for 
excellence in constitutional adjudicators" given the basic aims 
of judging, most centrally the achievement of justice. 125 Those 
virtues include such uncontroversial traits as temperance. 
courage, and humility, 1c" virtues we have already seen at work 
120. Rosalind Hursthouse. Virtue Theorv and Abortion. in YIRTl'E ETHICS. supra 
note 101. at 227. 229. 
121. Solum. supra note 11. at 498. 
122. !d. 
123. !d. 
124. !d. at 501--02: cf KRO~MA!';. supra note 8. at 16 ( .. The ideal of the lawyer 
statesman was an ideal of character. This meant that as one moved toward it. one became 
not just an accomplished technician but a distinctive and estimable type of human 
being-a person of practical wisdom ... ). 
125. !d. at 502. Although Solum's account. and mine too. focuses on constitutional 
judging. the same would be true if we focused on other areas of judging. 
126. For a detailed examination of the role of humility in judging. see Brett Scharffs. 
The Role of Humility in Exercising Practical Wisdom. 32 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 127 (1998). 
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in Powell and Farber and Sherry's books: they also, crucially, 
include practical wisdom, '"the virtue that enables one to make 
good choices in particular circumstances. " 127 A judge imbued 
with practical wisdom has thus "developed excellence in 
knowing what goals to pursue in the particular case and 
excellence in choosing the means to accomplish those goals. " 12s 
And, just as virtue ethics also generates a list of vices in 
contrast with the virtues, so virtue jurisprudence generates a 
list of judicial vices: corruption, cowardice, bad temper, and so 
J:'l) 
on. 
This is, again, an abbreviated account. And it is likely that 
virtue jurisprudence will face some of the same criticisms that 
have been raised against virtue ethics. L"' Perhaps the most 
common objection to virtue ethics is what has been called the 
"action-guiding objection. " 131 This objection argues that virtue 
ethics "lacks the capacity to yield suitably determinate action 
guides." 132 It does not, in short. tell us what to do in particular 
circumstances, besides the unhelpful advice that we do what a 
virtuous person would do. 1" And even if it offers us some useful 
guidance-even it for example, we have before us an 
uncontroversial model of a virtuous person- whatever guidance 
it provides is uncodifiable. Similarly, a critic of virtue 
jurisprudence might well make the standard faculty workshop 
move on just about any subject: that whatever is true about 
virtue jurisprudence is banal and unhelpful. 1 '~ 
To this objection we might make two responses.m The first 
is the common response to similar objections to virtue ethics: the 
127. Solum. supra note II. at 510. 
128. /d. For a thoughtful examination of the role of practical wisdom within judging. 
see Brett G. Scharffs. The Characrer of Le!!,al Reasoning. 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733 
(2004). 
129. See. e.g .. Solum. supra note 11. at 503-06. 
130. For a recent critical discussion of the use of virtue ethics in legal theory. see 
Ekow N. Yankah. Virrue"s Domain. 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1167. Yankah's criticisms are. 
however. directed primarily at the use of virtue ethics in criminal law theory. and are less 
pertinent to either a judge-centered approach to virtue jurisprudence in ·general or an 
aretaic account of constitutional judging in particular. 
131. David Solomon. /nremal Objecrions ro Virrue Erhics. in VIRTCE ETHICS. supra 
note 101. at 164. 169. 
132. /d. 
133. For a strong statement to this effect. see Louden. supra note 114. 
134. See, e.g.. HURSTHOL'SE. supra note 101. at 39: Watson. supra note 104. at 59. 
135. A third possible response. which I set aside here. is that the criticism itself is 
mistaken: that virtue ethics. and by extension virtue jurisprudence. does provide a useful 
guide for right conduct. See. e.f!, .. HLRSTHOL.SE. supra note 101. at 36. 
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··partners in crime," or tu quoque, response. 136 Just as the action-
guiding objection to virtue ethics "places demands on [virtue 
ethics] which neither deontological nor consequentialist 
normative theories can satisfy," 137 so similar objections to virtue 
jurisprudence. whether grounded on Dworkinian principle or 
legal formalism or some other general decision-oriented theory 
of judging. suffer from similar frailties. They cannot supply a 
strong set of codifiable rules that will guide us in making 
particular decisions. This not only places those critiques in a 
'"rhetorically awkward position" and shifts the burden to the 
objectors. 1" It also reminds us of the centrality of character in 
any reasonably accurate account of judging, and the extent to 
which judicial character is simply an unavoidable feature of the 
judicial role. thus making an aretaic approach all the more 
attractive as a starting point. 
The second response is a more positive one. It argues that 
what critics of virtue jurisprudence see as bugs in the system are 
actually features. It takes the position that, just as the search for 
action-guiding rules in moral philosophy has failed. so any search 
for an overarching set of rules to guide adjudication, and 
particularly constitutional adjudication, is likewise bound to fail. 
No rule-centered approach to constitutional judgment can 
substitute a set of guiding principles that work in practice;139 none 
of them can substitute for the "situation sense" that is required 
in the act of judging, constitutional or otherwise. 1 ~0 We are better 
off focusing on what a sound sense of judicial character requires 
than we are hoping for a comprehensive action-guiding theory of 
judicial and constitutional interpretation that almost certainly 
will never arrive. 
That the relative uncodifiability of an agent-centered. 
aretaic approach to either moral philosophy or judging is. on this 
136. Solomon. supra note 131. at 171. 
137. /d. 
138. /d. 
LI'J. I emphasize the words .. in practice." Some legal academics may continue to 
insist on the rightness of some particular method of constitutional or legal interpretation. 
Although I think they are wrong. it suffices for now to note Posner's view that "there are 
no consistent legalists ... in the judiciary. as distinct from the academy. where reality 
does not constrain imagination" (Posner 48); see also KRONMAN. supra note 8. at 319 
("[S]ince judges are neither constrained by the need to make money from their work nor 
encouraged to turn their opinions in specific cases into academic theories. one might 
expect them to place a higher value on practical wisdom than law teachers and 
practitioners do ... ). 
140. See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN. THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: 
DECIDING APPEALS (1960). 
2009] BOOK REVIEWS 153 
view, treated as, well. a virtue of that approach, suggests 
something about what I would argue are the limitations of virtue 
jurisprudence and its dangerous temptations. On the view I have 
offered here, virtue jurisprudence is not and should not be 
treated as a decision guide in any thick sense. Aristotle famously 
observed that ''the whole account of matters of conduct must be 
given in outline and not precisely." and that "the account of 
particular cases ... [does] not fall under any art or precept but 
the agents themselves must in each case consider what is 
appropriate to the occasion. '' 1 ~ 1 As such, although virtue 
jurisprudence may help us in forming and framing an 
understanding of the traits that should constitute any virtuous 
judge, and may help us identify clear examples of judicial virtue 
or vice, it will not offer a more exacting and precise guide to 
right judicial conduct in particular cases. There is generally no 
one right answer to the question what a virtuous person should 
do in any given case.'4' So it is with virtuous judging too. 
So a virtue jurisprude should be comfortable with the fact 
that virtue jurisprudence, constitutional or otherwise, is neither a 
clear ex ante guide to right judicial methods. although it may tell 
us something about what kinds of people we want on the 
bench, 143 nor a terribly useful ex post basis for critiques of 
particular judicial results. She should be comfortable with the 
fact that virtue jurisprudence is a guide to the decision makers. 
not the decisions. We should avoid the obvious temptation that 
so frequently infects constitutional theorists. who, having erected 
a fairly broad theory of sound judging. engage in (generally 
unconvincing) efforts to show how that particular theory cashes 
out precisely in a series of cases. 1~ Perhaps the least persuasive 
141. Aristotle. Nichomachean Ethics 1104al-7 in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 
(Richard McKeon ed .. 2001 ). 
142. See Statman.lntroduction. supra note 103. at 13. 
143. See, e.g.. Lawrence B. Solum. The Virlltes and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian 
Guide to Judicial Selection. 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735 ( 1988). 
144. To take one example. consider Jed Rubenfeld's elegant theory of the role of 
commitment. writtenness. and time in constitutionalism. and his less convincing effort to 
build and apply an interpretive guide based on that theory. centered around the idea of 
paradigm cases. I feel confident in saying that one can wholly embrace the first half of his 
important project without feeling especially compelled to adopt the second half. See JED 
Rt:BENFELD. FREEDOM AND TI\1E: A THEORY OF CO;o.~STITCTIO!\AL SELF-
GOVERNMENT (2001): JED RL:BE:-.iFELD. REVOU'TION BY JL'DICIARY: THE STRL'CTCRE 
OF A'.1ERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005). See, e.g .. Erwin Chemerinsky. A Grand 
Theory of Constitwional Law?. 100 MICH. L. REV. 1249. 1261 (2002) (book review) 
(arguing that the paradigm case method. as presented in Freedom and Time. is "verv 
sketchy"): Brannon P. Denning. Brother, Can You Paradigm?. 23 Co;o.~sT. COMMENT. 8i 
(2006) (book review) (arguing that Rel'Ollllion by Judiciary does not solve these 
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aspect of Farber and Sherry's Judgment Calls, I have argued, is 
that book's effort to demonstrate the applicability of its 
approach through a series of case studies involving abortion. 
affirmative action, and the war on terror. We should take a 
lesson from this about the limitations of virtue jurisprudence. 
Similarly. virtue jurisprudence should avoid the urge to 
advance too thick a set of conclusions about what a virtue 
account of constitutional law requires: or. at the least. it should 
recognize the unlikelihood that those conclusions will necessarily 
be persuasive to fellow virtue jurisprudes, who may be more 
attracted to the uncodifiability of the judicial virtues than to the 
notion that they can result in a thick account of judicial 
interpretation that ends up looking substantially like the action 
guides offered by non-aretaic theories of legal interpretation. 
Here, I regretfully part company with Larry Solum, who is surely 
the leading writer on virtue jurisprudence. For those who would 
insist on "a less abstract account of the aretaic approach to 
constitutional interpretation,"1·" Solum offers a set of principles 
"that give more shape and structure to the idea of constitutional 
justice as lawfulness, " 14" and that he aptly labels ''aretaic 
constitutional formalism. "147 Thus, it turns out. in his view, that 
virtuous constitutional judges must look, more or less in ranked 
order, to precedent, plain meaning. constitutional structure, 
original meaning, and a set of default rules favoring "settled 
historical practice by the political branches. weighted by 
duration, proximity to ratification, the soundness of the reasons 
offered for the practice, and strength of consensus among the 
political branches." 14" 
Solum acknowledges that "there are many ways to 
articulate an aretaic theory of constitutional interpretation that 
realize the ideal of constitutional justice as lawfulness. " 14~ So we 
need not take him as offering the final word on what 
constitutional virtue requires of judges. I. for one, am not willing 
to follow him very far down the path he sets out. In my view, 
constitutional virtue does not convincingly demand that the 
virtuous judge be a formalist. Perhaps more controversially, 
there is no reason to think that a virtuous judge cannot be 
problems). 
l.f5. Solum. supra note II. at 520. 
l.f6. /d. at 521. 
l.f7. /d. at 520. 
l.f8. /d. at 521-22. 
l.f9. /d. at 522. 
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substantially similar in his or her conduct to the kind of 
constrained pragmatist that Posner offers up as the preferable 
judge in a non-ideal world. That may seem a strange conclusion, 
since Posner's pragmatism seems to suggest the kind of 
instrumentalism that an aretaic theory of judging might reject. 
just as virtue ethics typically rejects utilitarianism as a moral 
theory. But pragmatism strikes me as an approach that better 
responds to and accounts for the myriad complexities of judging, 
for which no action guide is possible: and its constrained nature, 
which Posner is at pains to emphasize, suggests that it need not 
be a free-for-all and, indeed. will be suitably hedged in by the 
very questions of virtue and character that a sound virtue 
jurisprudence places at the center of the judicial enterprise. 
Contrary to both Solum and PowelL then. I think a virtuous 
judge can indeed take into account instrumental considerations. 
although he should do so in all the fullness of practical wisdom. 
But that debate can perhaps wait for another day. For now. it is 
enough to observe that virtue jurisprudence should avoid the 
temptation to codify itself too precisely or offer too thick an 
account of what it requires. To those who demand "a less 
abstract account of the aretaic approach to constitutional 
interpretation," the best answer may be. to paraphrase Rosalind 
Hursthouse, "it depends on what you mean by abstract. " 1511 Or 
perhaps we should simply acknowledge that virtue jurisprudence 
cannot offer a clear fixed account of what judging requires in 
particular cases, and see this as a virtue rather than a defect of 
the aretaic approach. As Solum suggests. this response may 
leave some unsatisfied readers in its wake. But it should be clear 
that, while the aretaic turn may have many useful things to say 
about the judicial role. and even some useful things to say about 
how well or poorly particular cases instantiate them, the belief 
that particular decisions can be evaluated in a comprehensive 
fashion according to some overarching constraining theory of 
constitutional interpretation ought to have been laid to rest by 
now. Virtue jurisprudence ought not fret too much about 
meeting its competitors head-on if they ultimately offer no 
better guide to judicial decision making. 
If it is the case that a virtue jurisprudence approach to the 
judicial role, and to constitutional law in particular, is not and 
should not be treated as an action guide or as providing an 
especially detailed means of evaluating particular judicial 
150. See HL'RSTHOL'SE. supra note 101. at 3'1. 
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opinions, then what value does this approach have, and why 
pursue it? We have already seen one answer: that whether or not 
virtue jurisprudence can provide these goods, it is far from clear 
that any competing account of constitutional interpretation can 
ultimately offer them either. Those approaches, too, fail to 
provide meaningful action guides. All of them ultimately must 
rely to some degree on questions of judicial character, and so it 
is surely worthwhile to explore this question on its own terms, 
putting the question of character first rather than treating it as 
secondary. That leads to another answer. As Solum suggests, at 
least a thin theory of judicial virtue is likely to result in a list 
virtues that might "correspond to almost any theory of 
constitutional interpretation. " 151 Thus, no matter what one's 
normative interpretive starting point, there is likely to be not 
only room for. but a necessity for, some attention to judicial 
character and virtue. Again, recall Posner's observation that 
even the most rigid legalists, whose theories would (if they 
could) eliminate "judgment calls" from the judicial role. 
continues to admire the "elusive faculty" of good judgment 
(Posner 117). 
Finally, we might respond that an aretaic approach to the 
judicial role. whether in constitutional law or elsewhere. can be a 
valuable supplement to or substitute for other approaches to 
thinking about judging because it can help us thread a more 
useful path between the descriptive and the normative, between 
the real world of the judicial "is" and the more ideal world of the 
judicial "ought." For an aretaic approach to judging, although it 
builds from a model of virtue and compares actual decisions to 
the decision that an ideally virtuous judge might make in 
particular circumstances, is also an approach that can build on 
the actual limited capacities of judges in the real world. Rather 
than wait for the perfectly virtuous judge to emerge from over 
the horizon like a sun god, it can and does ask questions of 
immediate pertinence to the judges we actually have. As Solum 
writes. ''When it comes to nonideal theory, virtue jurisprudence 
offers a set of practical recommendations. ,Joe What virtue 
jurisprudence offers is a useful and practical, but not utterly 
disenchanted. way of thinking about how we might design our 
judicial institutions and practices in light of both what we know 
about non-ideal judges, and what we might hope for from ideally 
151. Solum. supra note 11. at 499. 
152. /d. at 49R. 
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virtuous judges. In particular, it can ask two questions: What set 
of institutional norms, practices, and constraints might help 
constrain our Uudicial) vices? And what set of institutional 
norms, practices, and constraints might help nourish our 
Uudicial) virtues? 
These questions might seem to be in some tension with what 
readers would expect of a virtue-centered theory of judging, 
particularly one that builds on Aristotelian theory. To concede 
that we are concerned with building the best judges possible out 
of non-ideal material, and that we will use specific rules or 
practices to do so, may seem to move closer to an action guide 
for judges, or might seem to deny from the start the possibility of 
genuinely virtuous judging, in the Aristotelian sense of judging 
in the right way and for the right reasons, not because of some 
external set of constraints. 
For a variety of reasons, I think such an objection would be 
mistaken. Because one of those reasons arguably moves a step 
away from Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, I have 
called mine only a somewhat aretaic perspective on judging. 
Perhaps that is somewhat misleading or unnecessary. given the 
wide acknowledgement that virtue ethics need not necessarily be 
Aristotelian in nature. 1" I simply want to emphasize that the 
approach I offer here, while distinctly aretaic in nature, by no 
means assumes the perfect virtue of the judges, human as they 
are, who inevitably will be the ones actually charged with the 
duty of decision. 
First, then, virtue theory, while recognizing that much 
depends on the practical wisdom of individual agents, and that 
no codifiable set of rules or practices can determine in advance 
the exercise of practical wisdom in judgment, does not scorn 
helpful advice about how the virtuous agent should act. It does 
believe that no rulebook of practical wisdom is possible, and that 
no one can be a virtuous actor unless he or she has accumulated 
a capacity for practical wisdom that can only come from time 
and experience. 1' 4 But it also assumes that even imperfectly 
virtuous people have some sense of what virtue requires. and 
that when faced with a dilemma they can always also "seek 
moral guidance from people [they] think are morally better than 
[themselves]," either literally or by taking the actions of morally 
153. See, e.g .. HURSTHOCSE. supra note 101, at 8-9. 
154. See id. at 59-61. 
158 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 26:97 
superior agents as models for future conduct. 1" So virtue ethics 
assumes both the moral imperfection of most agents and the 
possibil~~?' th.at the imperfect may seek .guidance ~rom the f!lore 
perfect. · It IS but a short step from this to the VIew that virtue 
ethics can accept guidance from a variety of sources, even a 
(loosely) codified or written set of recommendations about 
virtuous judicial conduct. 
Second. virtue ethics by no means denies or neglects the 
importance of institutions and institutional structures in helping 
to form and constrain the virtuous actor. To the contrary. the 
Nichomachean Ethics concludes with a preview of Aristotle ·s 
Politics. asking what sort of society and what set of laws might 
aid human flourishing, and thus virtue. by ensuring that men are 
·'well trained and habituated" and "spend [their] time in worthy 
occupations and neither willingly nor unwillingly do bad 
actions. "1" It asks, in short, what sort of society would best be 
suited for human flourishing, and thus virtue. 
What is true for society writ large is true for the institutions 
within it. Particular institutions may have their own telos, and we 
may ask of those institutions whether they can be structured in a 
way that encourages or requires the actors within them to act 
virtuously in accordance with those ends. This line of inquiry has 
been the basis for an increased interest within virtue ethics in the 
application of that theory to particular practices and 
professions. 1'' 
Thus, Edmund Pellegrino argues that professions involve a 
literal profession, "publicly and in ... codes and Oaths," to an 
un-self-interested commitment to the goals of particular 
professions. and that this "act of profession is at the moral center 
of authentic professional ethics. " 1' 9 Jennifer Radden argues that 
a number of virtues "have been seen as required across all 
professional practices." and that particular "role-constituted 
155. /d. at 35. 
156. Cf W. Bradley Wendel. !Von/ega/ Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social 
Norms in Professional Communities. 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955. 1972-73 (2001) 
The ethic of honor ... hold[s] up for admiration figures who are widely 
accepted as persons of honor and say[s]. in effect. 'What that person does is 
what vou should do as well.· An honor soc1etv therefore fosters an ongomg 
process of introspection about the ideals to which the society aspires. 
157. Aristotle. supra note 141. at 1180a15-17. 
158. See generally WORKING VIRTlJE. supra note 116: Oakley & Cocking. supra note 
105: see also Robert C Solomon. Corporate Roles. Personal Virtues: An Aristotelian 
Approach to Business Ethics. in VIRT\JE ETHICS. supra note 101. at 205. 
159. Pellegrino. supra note 116. at 62. 
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moral virtues within [a given! practice setting" '"impose[ ] special 
duties on its practitioners. ,t ' Although Radden thinks that, in 
the long run, professionals come to inhabit their roles fully and 
cannot simply feign the virtues pertinent to their profession, 
particularly experience-based virtues like practical wisdom, at 
the outset the professional may "enact" the professional role 
"without an accompanying sense of authenticity or 
identification. ,tnt Thus, although virtuous practice is the long-
term goal, in the short run "[a ]dopting the conduct and/or 
~irtues of the _ethicaltWrofessional] may have to precede feeling 
hke a [professiOnal]." -
Similarly, Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking, who agree with 
Pellegrino that "the focus of virtue ethics on functions and ends 
fits well with professional practice, which can readily be 
regarded as having a teleological structure, "t"' argue for the 
value of "regulative ideals" within particular professions, which 
is to say the formulation and internalization of "a certain 
conception of correctness or excellence" within a professional 
role, such that the person who accepts it "conforms- or at least 
does not conflict-with that standard."tM Because these 
regulative ideals "operate as guiding background conditions on 
our motivation, they can direct us to act appropriately or even 
rightly, even when we do not consciously formulate them or aim 
at them."t6' So, for example, someone who has studied jazz piano 
may "develop[ ] a conception of excellence in jazz piano," and 
may subsequently "be guided by this conception of jazz 
excellence" when playing, "without consciously formulating that 
conception" as he plays.t~>~> Their account does not depend on the 
codifiability of "the values that determine excellence in a certain 
160. Radden. supra note 117. at 114. 11R. 
161. /d. at 125. 
162. /d.: see also John T. Noonan. Jr.. Educarion, Intelligence, and Character in 
Judges. 71 MINN. L. REV. 1119. 1124 (1987) ("To do verv well at law .... one must be 
socialized in the basic concepts and the professional ethics. After that. a powerful mind 
will develop itself by professional endeavors."). 
163. Oakley & Cocking. supra note I 05. at 3. 
164. /d. at 25.: see also W. Bradkelv Wendel. Lmn-ers. Citizens, and the Internal 
Point of View. 75 FORDHAM L. REV. J.nj_ 1477 (2006) . 
[T]o participate in certain social practices entails accepting the authority of 
regulative standards as guides to behavior. and accepting the legitimacy of 
criticism based on those standards. These regulative standards are not arbitrarv. 
but have their origin in some ultimate state of affairs or value that is the aim of 
the social practice of which they are a part. Normativity is therefore explained 
in teleological terms. with the norms governing a social practice being justified 
in terms of the ends for which the practice is constituted. 
165. Oakley & Cocking. supra note 105. at 26. 
166. /d. 
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regulative ideaL" as long as those values can conceivably play 
some sort of "guiding or governing role in the motivation and 
behaviour" of the actor. 1" 7 In short, as these examples suggest, 
virtue ethics is perfectly compatible with the development of 
some set of values, principles, or even formulated practices and 
rules that, through a process of internalization, help constrain 
vicious behavior and encourage virtuous behavior within a 
particular activity. 1N< 
Finally- and here is where I perhaps take a step away from 
standard aretaic discussions-we must not neglect the role of 
continence within our understanding of the virtues and virtuous 
conduct. 1" 9 The Nichomachean Ethics spends some time 
investigating character traits-continence and incontinence-
that are "not as blameworthy as the vices but not as 
praiseworthy as the virtues. "170 An incontinent (or akratic) 
person "goes against reason as a result of" passion or emotion; a 
continent, or enkratic, person "experiences a feeling that is 
contrary to reason; but, unlike the akratic, he acts in accordance 
with reason. His defect consists solely in the fact that, more than 
most people, he experiences passions that conflict with his 
rational choice. "171 As Hursthouse relates, Aristotle contrasts the 
continent character, "who, typically, knowing what she should 
do, does it, contrary to her desires," with the fully virtuous 
cha~~cter, "wh?, lJpically: kno""':ing_ what she shoul? do, does it, 
desmng to do It." - In Anstotle s VIew, "the fully vutuous agent 
is morally superior to the merely self-controlled one.'' 173 
167. !d. at 27. 
168. See also Fallon. supra note 13. at 6-7 (noting that the Constitution ··furnishes 
standards of legally required and forbidden conduct."" or ··normative constitutional 
constraints:· that ··take the form of constitutionally inspired experiences of obligation"") 
(emphasis in original). 
169. For useful discussions of this concept. see HL'RSTHOUSE. supra note 101. at 92-
99. 103-04: Richard Kraut. Aristotle's Ethics. in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics: Statman. Introduction. supra 
note 103. at 29-30: see also JONATHAN LEAR. ARISTOTLE: THE DESIRE TO 
U-;DERSTAND 174-86 (1998) (focusing on incontinence rather than continence). 
170. Kraut. supra note 169. 
171. /d. 
172. HCRSTHOL:SE. supra note 101. at 92 (emphasis in original). 
173. /d. at 93. Readers in virtue ethics will know that the distinction between virtue 
and continence is the basis for a substantial debate between virtue ethics and Kantian 
deontology. in which there is a 
widespread view according to which Aristotle and Kant have a fundamental 
disagreement about whether the good person is the one with full virtue (arete). 
who does the right thing naturally and enjoys doing it .... or whether he/she 1s 
the self-controlled person (enkrateie). who does the right thing in spite of a 
desire to do otherwise. Statman. Introduction. supra note 103. at 29. 
2009] BOOK REVIEWS 161 
In keeping with virtue ethics' focus on the fully virtuous 
person as the model for right conduct, it is understandable that 
less attention has been focused on the enkratic, or continent, 
agent. A continent person, after alL is not, by definition, a fully 
virtuous person. In the nonideal world, however, there is every 
reason to want to focus on the continent agent, who at least does 
the right thing, even if she does so against her own desires. Such 
an approach is still aretaic, inasmuch as it is still focused on 
questions of character. But it may be more realistic, more "is"-
centered, in its acceptance of the kinds of human limitations that 
form the core of Posner's work. Too lofty a normative vision of 
virtue may, in light of the reality of judges as "political agents 
making policies and laws, ... put a strain on the notion of the 
virtuous judge."174 We may conclude that if judges cannot be 
perfectly virtuous, still, if they can refrain from vice, they may be 
"'good enough'" for our purposes.m So, if we are to fuse the real 
world of judging with the more normative account of judicial 
virtue, we may want to consider the ways in which we can 
structure the moves and practices of the judicial game in a way 
that, if it cannot guarantee judicial virtue, can at least encourage 
judicial continence. In fact, the two are not in opposition to each 
other. Just as the fledgling doctor may begin by "enacting" her 
professional role "without an accompanying sense of 
authenticity or identification," and only acquire the "identity 
conferring aspect of [the] professional role[ ]" with time and 
experience,176 so the same set of norms and influences that 
encourage continence in a judge may over time ripen into a 
fuller sense of judicial virtue. To attempt to encourage at least a 
minimal sense of judicial continence may thus in the long run 
maximize the possibility of judicial virtue. 
In short, an aretaic approach to judging might lead us to 
think about what set of institutional norms, practices, and 
constraints might help constrain judicial vice and nourish judicial 
virtue. Solum, for instance, argues that the judicial selection 
process should "prioritize the nomination and confirmation of 
In keeping with the '"dialectical development" of virtue ethics. id. at 30. Hursthouse and 
Philippa Foot have argued that Aristotle and Kant are not as far from each other as the 
conventional view would hold. See HURSTHOUSE. supra note 101. at 92-104. These 
matters are well beyond the scope of this Essay. 
174. Judith N. Shklar. Justice Without Virtue. in VIRTUE: NOMOS XXXIV. supra 
note 101. at 283. 286. Shklar·s short but electric essay is required reading. in my view. for 
anyone interested in virtue jurisprudence. 
175. !d. 
176. Radden. supra note 117. at 125. 
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individuals who possess the judicial virtues," that "'programs of 
judicial education should aim to cultivate those virtues in those 
who are already judges," and that imperfectly virtuous judges 
"should aim to emulate the decisions of excellent judges when 
they can and exemplify the virtue of judicial humility" -a point 
which we mi~ht recharacterize in terms of continence- "when 
they cannot." 77 
Beyond these basic recommendations, we might also draw 
here on a number of possible constraints offered in the books 
under review. Both Posner and Farber and Sherry offer a host of 
practical suggestions based on the inglorious determinants of 
judicial behavior in the real world. Posner, for example, 
emphasizes that the constrained pragmatist judge is "boxed 
in ... by norms that require of judges impartiality, awareness of 
the importance of the law's being predictable enough to guide 
the behavior of those subject to it ... , and a due regard for the 
integrity of the written word in contracts and statutes" (Posner 
13). Like Solum, he emphasizes the role of the confirmation 
process in ''[w]eeding out candidates unwilling to play [the 
judicial game] by the rules'' (Posner 90), and he adds that the 
rigorous and unpleasant nature of both the confirmation process 
and, to a lesser extent, legal training in general may constitute an 
external constraint that generates an internal constraint, a 
"commitment to the institution" of judging (Posner 127). 17~ 
Similarly, Farber and Sherry argue that both legal education and 
legal practice creates "a professional lifetime of acquired 
tendencies that discourage unchecked discretion" (Farber & 
Sherry 115). and they offer a set of modest reforms to Supreme 
Court practice, such as the diversification of cases beyond 
controversial constitutional questions and the opening up of the 
"cert. pool," to ''try to ensure that service on the Court 
reinforces rather than diminishes professionalism" (Farber & 
Sherry 119). 
Perhaps surprisingly, though, I want to return to Powell, 
whose rhapsodic account of the moral dimensions of judging I 
have already suggested is too much fixed on the "ought" rather 
than the "is." Nevertheless, Powell identifies a central constraint 
on judges when he begins his book with a discussion of the 
centrality of the judicial oath, which figures so prominently in 
177. Solum. supra note 11. at 498-99. 
178. Cf Pellegrino. supra note 116 (discussing medical training): Radden. supra note 
117 (discussing training in psychiatry and medicine). 
2009] BOOK REVIEWS 163 
Marbury v. Madison. As we have seen, Powell believes that 
judicial review as a practice flows not only from the 
Constitution, but "from the judge ·s individual obligations as a 
moral actor" (Powell 3). He thus sees in the '"oath requirement a 
juxtaposition of the judiciary's governmental role and the judge's 
personal conscience. one that gives moral weight to the 
individual's exercise of the power of judicial review that the 
community has entrusted to him'' (Powell 3). For Powell, the 
oath thus "bears directly on how the judge carries out his duties 
and understands his role in relationship to other governmental 
officials'' (Powell3). 17~ 
At the risk of being rhapsodic myself. I think the oath 
deserves this attention. 1"" The short but sweeping language of the 
federal judicial oath. with its injunction to "administer justice 
without respect to persons. and do equal right to the poor and to 
the rich," and to "faithfully and impartially discharge all the 
duties incumbent upon me ... under the Constitution and laws 
of the United States, .,JKI is an apt, if open-ended. description of 
and ode to the judicial virtues. As Powell observes, the judicial 
oath, and the formalities attendant upon swearing it/"2 ties the 
judge's character intimately to his or her office, rendering every 
decision in office both one that has official weight and must be 
undertaken consistently with the judge's official duties, and one 
that has about it a sense of personal moral obligation. Properly 
understood and seriously considered, the oath can be a forceful 
179. See also John McCarthy QC. Conremporary Advocacy: Value-Free?. 38 CATH. 
LAW. 25. 35 ( 1998) (arguing that ""the very constitution of our courts."" including the 
judicial oath. ""manifests an immediate moral dimension·· that is immanent in the act of 
oath-taking itself). 
180. Indeed. this Essay is in a sense a preview of broader work I am undertaking on 
both the history and meaning(s) of the judicial oath. and of the relationship between 
constitutional oaths and constitutional interpretation more generally. For a short essay 
focusing on the Presidential oath and constitutional interpretation. see Paul Horwitz. 
Honor's Constitlllional Momenr: The Oath and Presidential Transitions. 103 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 1067 (2009). 
181. 28 u.s.c. § 453 (2006). 
182. Although I focus on the oath here. we might add to our list of important 
constraints on judges all the "trappings"" of the judicial role-robes. the bench. and so 
on-that. although they may increase the judge's self-regard and thus his tendency to fall 
into certain kinds of judicial vice. such as arrogance. also serve to make ··judicial decision 
making ... public and formal and therefore more cautious·· (Farber & Sherry at 94). 
Chad Oldfather makes the somewhat different point that. ··At least implicitly. we impute 
near-magical properties to the acts of taking an oath and donning a black robe. as if they 
somehow eliminate one"s susceptibility to all the foibles. biases. and petty jealousies that 
are the stuff of day-to-day life ... Oldfather. supra note 26. at 127. That is surely true. but 
my reliance on the oath and other solemnities here is not for their magical property to 
transform someone into a non-human being. but for the degree to which they may 
influence and constrain the actual traits and role identities of judges. 
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reminder of what virtuous judging demands. 1H' It can also be a 
constraint for the potentially incontinent or imperfectly virtuous 
judge. 
To be sure, the oath carries with it no realistic fear of 
penalty, and perhaps in this sense Posner is right to say that it is 
little more than a loyalty oath, and a lightly constraining one at 
that (Powell 5). Like the Hippocratic Oath, it is largely an 
internal constraint, and one whose ancient status (its language 
has barely been altered since the Judiciary Act of 1789) and 
open-ended terms do not, at first blush, provide much guidance 
for judges. It is, in Oakley and Cocking's words, a regulative 
ideal, but not a very precise one. I am too ill-versed in judicial 
psychology to know whether judges think very strongly about 
the oath either when they take it or long afterwards, and one can 
well imagine that judges might either ignore its language or fail 
to see any meaningful constraint on them in its terms. But I 
think we can say three more meaningful things about the power 
of the oath to encourage judicial continence or virtue, two of 
them fairly practical in nature and one more exploratory and 
speculative. 
Practically, it is important to see that there is a potential 
connection between the oath and judges' "desire for self-respect 
and for respect from other judges and legal professionals 
generally," as well as the "intrinsic satisfactions of judging," two 
tastes that Posner calls "the biggest internal constraints" on 
judges' conduct (Posner 371; see also Posner 60-62, 70). The 
taste for both self-respect and the respect of others "requires 
conformity to the accepted norms of judging," which, as Posner 
recognizes, are captured in the oath itself (Posner 61, 70). Thus, 
obedience to the oath, and the vision of judicial virtue it 
presents, is ultimately a form of winning self-respect and the 
respect of others, and thus maximizing a judge's own satisfaction 
in her job. Second, although the oath may be a loose regulative 
ideal, it is still a regulative ideal of sorts. As such, it may be 
internalized, in a way that either encourages judicial virtue or at 
least demands a minimal level of judicial continence. 1>4 
183. For similar reflections. which capture in part the moral and jurisprudential 
meanings that can be gleaned from a close reading of the judicial oath. see Shirley S. 
Abrahamson. Commentary on Jeffrey M. Shaman·s The Impartial Judge: Detachment or 
Passion?. 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 633 (1996). For an article suggesting. without offering 
much argument. the centrality of the judicial oath to the judicial role. see Diane P. Wood. 
Reflections on the Judicial Oath. 8 GREEN BAG 2d 177 (2005). 
184. See Oakley & Cocking. supra note 105. at 25 (regulative ideals may be 
internalized "in such a way that [agents] are able to adjust their motivation and conduct 
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Finally, and more positively, we might begin rethinking the 
importance of the oath as part of a broader aretaic turn. We 
might, in short, think of "reviving" the centrality of the oath 
along with, and as a necessary part of, a broader revival of the 
sense of the importance of judicial virtue. This is not so much an 
idealistic project as a project whose concern is to recover and 
reinforce the background context and conditions in which 
judicial virtue might flourish in the real world. To the extent 
that, as Posner argues and Powell agrees, judging involves 
playing the "judicial game," this project may be seen as an effort 
to reinforce those rules of the game that emphasize and 
encourage the flourishing of the judicial virtues. The "revival" of 
the oath might be one piece, although a symbolically important 
and practically constraining one, of that broader project. 
Although this is not a purely idealistic project, it is a 
substantial one. As some virtue theorists have noted, the aretaic 
turn can be seen as "opting ultimately for a different kind of 
society and for different relationships among its members." 1'' 
Thus, reviving a sense of the centrality of the judicial oath, as 
Powell recommends, or the centrality of a virtue-oriented 
account of constitutional law more generally, may ultimately 
entail rethinking and reshaping the values that surround the 
American constitutional enterprise more broadly, and perhaps 
the wider American political nomos. The oath itself, for instance, 
is broadly tied to questions of personal and political honor; 1'" and 
honor itself is generally taken to be a weak or obsolete virtue 
today.w To be sure, we might rely, as we have seen, on the 
connection between the oath and the judicial taste for self-
respect and the respect of others. But the oath was once 
arguably tied to a thicker sense of honor than that, one which 
ran deep in the American political mind. 1" So a revival of the 
oath entails a revival of the sense of honor as an important spur 
so that it conforms-or at least does not conflict-with that standard''). 
185. Statman.lntroduction. supra note 103 at 2. 
186. See. e.g .. Horwitz. supra note 180. at 1071-72. 
187. See, e.g .. Peter Berger. On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honour. II EL:R. 
J. Soc. 39 (1970). reprinted in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 149 (Michael J. Sandel ed .. 
1984): Wendel. supra note 156. at 1969 (noting the "anachronistic resonance" of the use 
of honor and shame as a regulatory mechanism): cf KRO~MAN. supra note 8. at 13 ("The 
classical figure of the lawyer-statesman has in my generation become a quaint antique 
with little of the power it once possessed to inspire or excite"): id. at 165 (arguing that the 
virtue- and character-centered ideals that underlie the ideal of the lawver-statesman "no 
longer possess the authority they once did"). · 
188. See generally JOANNE B. FREEMAN. AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIO~AL POLITICS 
I~ THE NEW REPUBLIC (200 I). 
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toward virtuous conduct and constraint against vicious 
conduct. 1'" 
We might, to be sure, find some support for this project in 
history, and judicial history in particular. Philip Hamburger has 
written recently in strong terms about the constraining force of 
judicial duty, a concept with deep roots in Anglo-American 
judicial history and one that is intimately tied to the obligations 
of the judicial oath. 1Yo But Hamburger may have romanticized 
somewhat his account of judicial duty:1y 1 and in any event, we 
have plainly moved a long way from any simple reliance on 
judicial duty or the oath, and an appeal to history will not change 
that any more than a visit to Colonial Williamsburg will turn us 
all into the Founding Fathers. 1"2 
CONCLUSION 
This may seem a somewhat romantic note on which to close 
this Essay. It is not meant to be. In its fullest form, the aretaic 
turn may indeed involve the kind of imaginative reconstruction 
of the norms and values of the judicial enterprise that I have 
described. It may be that the judicial virtues cannot flourish 
without planting new soil in which they can grow. 
But, as I have argued, we can see ways in which even the 
"hard-bitten realism" that Powell laments in Posner's vision of 
the judicial role provides some spaces in which an aretaic 
account of judging might take root. Indeed, it may be that we 
cannot attain Powell's broader goals without beginning with 
hard-bitten realism. 1y3 It may be that working within the spaces 
189. I should note that Aristotle himself did not count honor as a virtue. although he 
saw it as ··the greatest of external goods:· and one that a proud man is justly concerned 
with as ··the prize of virtue." albeit one that he should only receive to the extent of his 
deserts. Aristotle. supra note 141. at 1123b-1124a. 
190. PHILIP HA\1BCRGER. LAW AND JUDICIAL DCTY (2008). 
191. Or so l argue in a review of his book in 10 ENGAGE: THE JOURNAL OF THE 
FEDERALIST SOCIETY'S PRACTICE GROCPS 131 (2009). http://www.fed-soc.org/ 
doclib/20090720_Engage 102.pdf. 
192. See KRO:-.IMAN. supra note 8. at 13-14: 
(The lawyer-statesman ideal cannot be revived] merely by repeating what others 
have said about the ideal in the past. For it is just this-the traditional portrait 
of the lawyer-statesman-that has lost its power to inspire .... To regain some 
sense of its appeal. therefore. we must reconstruct the ideal of the lawyer-
statesman from the bottom up .... (O]nly philosophy can breathe life back into 
an ideal when the tradition that sustained it dies away. The recovery of every 
lost ideal is in that sense a philosophical project. and the model of the lawyer-
statesman is no exception. 
193. Cf. Annas. supra note 77 ("(A]n ethical theory is weakened if the best 
contempor-ary science conflicts with its claims or makes it hard to see how they could be 
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that Posner provides may. in the long run, best satisfy Powell's 
desires without slighting Posner's realism, and might be more 
realistic and less abstract than Farber and Sherry's own attempt 
to bridge the gap between the extremes. Within the crucial 
internal constraint of the judicial taste for respect and self-
respect, we can see ways in which both judicial continence and 
the judicial virtues might be encouraged. Within the judicial 
oath, we can see the seeds of a regulative ideal that might 
inform, constrain, and even inspire judges to virtue, or at least 
steer them toward continence and away from vice. It may be that 
once we have taken the aretaic turn, our thoughts will inevitably 
bend towards a broader imaginative reconstruction of the 
judicial role in accordance with judicial excellence. For the time 
being, however, it is enough to observe that an account of 
judging, constitutional and otherwise, that places judicial 
character at its center may be the best way to rethink the judicial 
role in a way that both takes the realities of the judicial "is" into 
account and tries to find new language, or revive old language, in 
a way that moves us toward a worthier. but still attainable, 
judicial "ought. "1y4 
true.""): Oldfather. supra note 26. at 145 (""Only by first locating the potential weak points 
in the judicial psyche can we hope to create institutions and develop mechanisms that 
serve as prophylactics against any resulting undesired consequences.""). 
194. Cf Fallon, supra note 13. at 977-79 (arguing that constitutional scholars have 
been too focused on normative theories and too inattentive to practical constraints on 
constitutional judging. while political scientists have been more focused on constraints 
but insufficiently aware of ""the ways in which legal norms may shape officials' goals and 
thereby constrain their behavior. .. and proposing that we ""open up the subject of 
constitutional constraints as a topic for inquiry in American constitutional theory""). 
